First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption by Goldberg, Erica
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 4 Article 1 
May 2020 
First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption 
Erica Goldberg 
University of Dayton, egoldberg1@udayton.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Erica Goldberg, First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption, 88 U. Cin. L. Rev. 959 (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and 
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact 
ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
959 
FIRST AMENDMENT CYNICISM AND REDEMPTION 
 Erica Goldberg* 
ABSTRACT 
This article proposes a way out of the vicious cycle of “First 
Amendment cynicism.”  First Amendment cynicism is the disingenuous 
application or non-application of the First Amendment to further political 
ends unrelated to freedom of expression.  The cycle is facilitated by either 
accurate or inaccurate perceptions of First Amendment cynicism by one’s 
political opponents.   
As one example, the perception by those on the political left that the 
right is applying the First Amendment cynically—turning the First 
Amendment into the “New Lochner”—leads the left to lose faith in First 
Amendment principles.  Some on the left then engage in First Amendment 
cynicism, not applying the First Amendment to those that harm their 
agenda.  This approach is then observed by the right, and the cycle 
continues.  Further, improper accusations of First Amendment cynicism, 
or what this article terms “second-order First Amendment cynicism” 
render this cycle ever more vicious. 
To restore both the perception and the reality of a First Amendment 
that serves the entire political spectrum, this article first demonstrates 
why the increasing accusations of First Amendment cynicism are 
overstated and ahistorical.  Later, this article argues that the First 
Amendment can be both nonpartisan—treating equally speech of all 
political stripes—and apolitical—leading to outcomes and social 
arrangements that favor no political ideology.  The best way to ensure 
that free speech doctrine remains nonpartisan and apolitical is to favor a 
civil libertarian approach.  However, courts should ensure that the First 
Amendment is egalitarian in cases where the government must intervene, 
such as cases involving speech on government land or cases involving the 
heckler’s veto.  Finally, this article proposes ways for the Supreme Court 
to manage its docket and refine existing First Amendment doctrine so that 
the First Amendment serves those who most need its protections.   
 
 
* Visiting Scholar, Georgetown Center for the Constitution, Georgetown Law School; Assistant Professor 
of Law, University of Dayton Law School.  I would like to thank Faisal Chaudhry, Dallan Flake, Joe 
Kovell, James Steiner-Dillon, Andrea Seielstad, and Andy Strauss for reading drafts or portions of this 
article and offering indispensable insights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment, perhaps more than any other constitutional 
provision, requires judges to apply its protections in a nonpartisan, 
apolitical way.1  If judges make decisions about whether to protect speech 
based on its underlying viewpoint or political valence, the purpose of free 
speech doctrine is nullified as it is applied.2  Unfortunately, as judges and 
 
 1. The meaning of nonpartisan is “somewhat nebulous and incomplete.”  George K. Yin, 
Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2287, 2320 (2013). Nonpartisan, in 
the sense of political impartiality, can be defined as “the absence of control by a self-interested individual 
or political party.” Mark Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239, 1297 (2008). For greater exploration of whether the First Amendment can 
be nonpartisan and apolitical, and distinctions between the two terms, see infra Part II. 
 2. The chief First Amendment evil is indeed censorship of views based on viewpoints. See R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from 
proscribing speech ... because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”). Judges should no more be 
empowered to prioritize certain views than legislators. See also Erica Goldberg, Free Speech 
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partisans harshly criticize perceived misuses of free speech principles,3 
society’s and even judges’ faith in the First Amendment, as a principled 
tool that protects liberty and benefits all members of society, is eroding.4  
In order to restore that necessary faith,5 this article seeks to demonstrate 
that accusations of “First Amendment cynicism”6—the disingenuous 
application or non-application of the First Amendment to further political 
ends unrelated to freedom of expression—are overstated, and that the 
First Amendment can be largely apolitical.7  This article further suggests 
doctrinal solutions within our existing free speech framework, such as 
disentangling free speech principles from economic liberties, clarifying 
the speech/conduct distinction, and distinguishing compelled speech 
protections from protections against the suppression of speech.  These 
alterations will help ensure that the First Amendment can benefit those 
who most need its protections.    
 Because there is no real consensus about the purpose and scope of free 
 
Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 720 (2016) (“[I]n the First Amendment context, allowing 
judges to determine which speech is protected for ideological reasons or which speech harms bother them 
personally would give courts the power to do something legislators cannot. Courts would then become 
the censors instead of the government.”).  
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. Just 25 years ago, one scholar wrote that “[w]ith all the cynicism in this country, however, 
the first amendment seems to have been untarnished.” Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider 
Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 97 n.264 (1994).  This has changed 
now. In Part I, this article outlines the accusations by both the left and the right of First Amendment 
cynicism. In addition, some recent surveys show that society’s respect for free speech has diminished over 
time, especially among younger adults and students. A 2016 study conducted by Gallup, the John S. and 
James L. Knight Foundation and the Newseum Institute found that students increasingly wish to regulate 
offensive speech and limit media access to campus protests. KNIGHT FOUND., FREE EXPRESSION ON 
CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGE STUDENTS THINK ABOUT FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES (2018), 
https://knightfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Knight_Foundation_Free_Expression_on_Ca 
mpus_2017.pdf; but see Matthew Yglasias, Everything We Think About the Political Correctness Debate 
is Wrong, VOX (Mar. 12, 2018 8:00 am), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/3/12/17100496/political-correctness-data.   
 5. Society’s perception that judges are applying the First Amendment in a principled way is 
different than, but affected by, whether judges are actually performing their jobs in a non-cynical way.  
Faith in our First Amendment jurisprudence is necessary to prevent a vicious cycle where those who 
believe the First Amendment is being applied cynically are thus more willing to apply it cynically to 
benefit their own political preferences.   
 6. In Part I, this article will more fully develop the concept of First Amendment cynicism and 
also add to this typology the concept of second-order First Amendment cynicism—where accusations of 
First Amendment cynicism are themselves are either demonstrably false or intended disingenuously to 
achieve political ends unrelated to free speech.  See infra Part I. 
 7. By apolitical, I mean that the political distribution of results that arise from protecting speech 
does not favor one ideology over another. First Amendment doctrine is nonpartisan because it is 
promulgated in a way that is facially neutral with respect to both the identity of the speaker and the 
viewpoint of the underlying speech. In addition, free speech doctrine can be apolitical if application of 
First Amendment law, given underlying social conditions, can distribute benefits among those of various 
political stripes in a way that sufficiently approximates equality of political outcomes. An apolitical First 
Amendment would not ultimately favor certain groups over other groups or be more likely to advance 
certain agendas over other agendas. See infra Part II. 
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speech rights, there is vast and growing discord about proper and 
improper uses of the First Amendment.8  Although First Amendment 
doctrine is superficially well established,9 there is deep disagreement over 
the theories animating the First Amendment, the types of activities its 
protections should cover, and the extent to which free speech liberties 
should be balanced against other societal interests.10  Supreme Court 
justices are explicitly accusing each other of “weaponizing” the First 
Amendment to secure other political ends.11  Charges abound of the 
cynical use of the First Amendment to circumvent economic regulation.  
Scholars, disillusioned by the outcomes of free speech cases, are 
questioning the most foundational, nonpartisan aspects of our critical free 
speech protections.12   Many believe that free speech jurisprudence does 
not serve society well, or does not even achieve the internal goals of the 
First Amendment.13   
The divisions underlying the First Amendment’s identity crisis have 
manifested in a way that threatens even formerly uncontroversial aspects 
 
 8. Timothy Zick, Restroom Use, Civil Rights, and Free Speech “Opportunism,” 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
963, 998 (2017) (discussing the difficulty of criticizing “opportunistic” uses of the First Amendment when 
“there is no agreed-upon consensus for what constitutes a proper use, as opposed to a misuse, of the Free 
Speech Clause”); see also Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY 
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone 
eds., 2002) (arguing that the vaunted, “show stopper” nature of the First Amendment in American society 
allows it to be used as a tool to accomplish goals unrelated to free speech). 
 9. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 692 (discussing how describing free speech doctrine is 
“superficially simple,” especially with respect to content-based restrictions on speech, but applying free 
speech doctrine becomes more complex). 
 10. Zick, supra note 8, at 998 (remarking upon the “capacious language of the Free Speech Clause 
and the inability of courts and scholars to produce a coherent theory or rule to cabin it”).  
 11. In her dissenting opinion in Janus v. AFSCME, Justice Elena Kagan claimed that the majority 
opinion, which overturned mandatory public sector union dues as unconstitutional, “prevent[ed] the 
American people, acting through their state and local officials, from making important choices about 
workplace governance. . . . by weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now 
and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.”  138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
 12. See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2018).  Louis Michael Seidman persuasively argues that, despite scholars’ 
efforts, free speech cannot serve progressive goals without compromising the bedrock principles of 
viewpoint neutrality and government nonfeasance, rendering free speech doctrine “unrecognizable as a 
realization of First Amendment ideals.” Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 2219, 2243, 2249 (2018) (“[Many progressives] just can't shake their mindless attraction 
to the bright flame of our free speech tradition. Progressives need to turn away before they are burned 
again.”). 
 13. Scholars have classified the First Amendment as “obsolete.” See Tim Wu, Is the First 
Amendment Obsolete, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2018) (arguing that “there is reason to fear [the First 
Amendment] is entering a new period of political irrelevance”).  Others have questioned the central 
premise that an unfettered marketplace of ideas leads to truth. See Brian 
Leiter, The Case Against Free Speech, 38 SYDNEY L. REV. 407, 409 (2016) (“[M]ost non-mundane 
speech people engage in is largely worthless, and the world be better off were it not expressed.”). 
4
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of free speech doctrine.14  Differences between the egalitarian and 
libertarian approaches to free speech doctrine have surfaced in the past,15 
but now these disagreements have escalated to a point where different 
factions may not be able to find much common ground—in both the 
theory and application of free speech doctrine.   
Accusations of political uses of the First Amendment may be 
legitimate, or may be examples of second-order First Amendment 
cynicism, reflecting the accuser’s own desire to use the First Amendment 
to achieve other political ends unrelated to free speech.  As an example, 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), a long time champion of 
robust free speech protections, is perceived by many, including former 
members, as abandoning its principled stance in the service of other 
political objectives.16  The ACLU has responded by explaining that in 
choosing which cases to take, the organization must consider other 
valuable social goals, like equality, but that its views of the doctrine 
remain unchanged.17  It is unclear how many of the current accusations of 
First Amendment cynicism are accurate and how many are overstated, or 
worse, are intended to shape the First Amendment cynically—to serve 
other political ends—as well. 
Overstated concerns about “First Amendment Lochnerism”18 and 
 
 14. A recent Columbia Law Review Symposium was dedicated to “Free Expression in an Age of 
Inequality.”  According to the Symposium’s two contributors, those searching for a more “egalitarian First 
Amendment,” who seek to combat “economic, racial, cultural, [and] constitutional” inequality will need 
to undermine foundational doctrinal ideals such as viewpoint neutrality. Kessler & Pozen, supra note 12, 
at 1954 (contending that those in favor of a more egalitarian First Amendment can achieve it best by 
“putting pressure on First Amendment norms ranging from content and viewpoint neutrality to the 
primacy of judicial enforcement to the baseline opposition to redistribution of expressive and 
informational resources”).    
 15. After the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010), Kathleen Sullivan explained the apparent shift in robust support for free speech principles from 
those on the political left to those on the political right as actually representing the tension between two 
underling, contested visions of the First Amendment—free speech as political liberty versus free speech 
as political equality. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 
144–45 (2010). See also infra Part II. 
 16. See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, The ACLU Retreats from Free Expression, WALL ST. J. June 20, 
2019, at A17; Alan Dershowitz, The Final Nail in the ACLU’s Coffin, HILL (June 11, 2018) 
www.thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/391682-the-final-nail-in-the-aclus-coffin; Erica Goldberg, An 
Open Letter to the ACLU, CROWDED THEATER (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2018/03/21/an-open-letter-to-the-aclu-on-civil-liberties/. 
 17. After a guidelines memo that some believed contained new ACLU policies towards freedom 
of expression, the ACLU’s Legal Director David Cole wrote a blog post to clarify the ACLU’s position.  
See David Cole, The ACLU’s Longstanding Commitment to Defending Speech We Hate, ACLU (June 20, 
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/aclus-longstanding-commitment-defending-
speech-we-hate. For responses to the ACLU’s response to criticism, see Eugene Volokh, ACLU’s David 
Cole Responds about ACLU and Freedom of Speech, REASON: VOLKOH CONSPIRACY (June 22, 2018, 
9:46 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/22/aclus-david-cole-responds-about-aclu-and. 
 18. The infamous case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (overruled by Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)), overturned a state statute limiting bakers to working 60 hours per week and 
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weaponization by the courts, reductive media coverage,19 Internet culture, 
heavy doses of academic legal realism,20 and compelling but overly 
politicized accounts by political leaders, have infused excessive 
pessimism into our perspective on the First Amendment.21  This 
pessimism threatens all of our speech rights, because it leads to a vicious 
cycle of unprincipled First Amendment jurisprudence.  If someone 
believes her political opponents are using the First Amendment cynically, 
as a political tool, she may be more likely to resign herself to an 
unprincipled First Amendment and advocate for cynical uses to serve her 
own political ends.  Her opponent will then observe this cynicism and be 
more inclined to use the First Amendment cynically, continuing the 
cycle.22  This cycle of cynicism is escalating between the political right 
and left in their approaches to free speech.23    
Scholars have devoted significant attention to the problems of 
weaponization of the First Amendment, but there has not been an effort 
to restore faith in a nonpartisan and apolitical First Amendment, and to 
 
10 hours per day on substantive due process grounds.  See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (finding “right to 
contract’ trumped state maximum hours law). The case is now generally used as an example of judicial 
overreach, especially in trying to control the economy and make purely political policy through 
application of constitutional principles. For discussions of First Amendment Lochnerism, which draws an 
analogy between free speech doctrine and the repudiated Lochner see, as examples, Mila Sohoni, The 
Trump Administration and the Law of Lochner, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1383–84 (2019); Jeremy K. Kessler, 
The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1917–18 & accompanying 
notes (2018); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 135–36 and accompanying 
notes (2016); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations 
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1233 (2014). 
 19. By this I mean both the media’s predominant fixation on the results of cases over their 
reasoning, and also the media’s focus on hot-button issues.  See infra Section I.C. for a discussion on how 
the media may be exaggerating the campus free speech problem, or excluding other types of First 
Amendment issues on college campuses. 
 20. Many academics simply do not believe the First Amendment can be applied in an apolitical 
way. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 12, at 2234 (discussing “the extent to which the speech game is 
competitive and the extent to which doctrinal manipulation can support politically discriminatory 
application of legal rules.”). 
 21. Popular portrayals of Supreme Court decisions by politicians generally infuse excessive 
skepticism into society’s understanding of what Justices do, but this phenomenon is especially corrosive 
in the First Amendment context. See, e.g., Erica Goldberg, We Must Restore Legitimacy to the Supreme 
Court, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Oct. 31, 2018 5:00 a.m.), 
https://www.dispatch.com/opinion/20181031/column-we-must-restore-legitimacy-to-us-supreme-court 
(describing, as one example, President Obama’s criticism of Citizens United, where President Obama 
“never mentioned the legal reasoning behind the Court’s decision  -- overturning federal law that limited 
money spent on supporting candidates prior to make documentaries, pamphlets and other media materials”  
-- but “noted only the outcome he found unfavorable”). 
 22. This is just one mechanism by which a vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism can occur. 
Not every individual or organization will be equally affected by perceived First Amendment cynicism by 
one’s opponents, but human psychology dictates that a collective loss of faith in the First Amendment 
could have serious consequences. In Part I, I describe mechanisms that may be currently perpetuating this 
cycle.   
 23. See infra Part I. 
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discuss modifications to the doctrine that might further de-politicize the 
doctrine.  This article argues that a deeper understanding of the history of 
First Amendment jurisprudence and its necessary implications 
demonstrate that that the current concerns about First Amendment 
Lochnerism by the right and First Amendment abandonment by the left, 
while not frivolous, are overstated.   Further, our longstanding civil 
libertarian First Amendment tradition—with some limiting principles—
is the best way to keep free speech doctrine nonpartisan and apolitical, 
restore the needed faith to keep the First Amendment legitimate, and 
return the First Amendment to its rightful place as our most exceptional 
and most vaunted constitutional right. 
Finally, to prevent society’s faith in the First Amendment from 
unraveling, new accords must be reached about the extent of the First 
Amendment’s coverage, and new arguments must convince people that 
the costs of free speech are worth its freedoms.  This article develops 
strategies for de-politicizing free speech cases, including managing the 
docket to select for cases where egalitarian and libertarian approaches to 
free speech overlap. It also provides arguments for convincing both 
scholars and the public that strong free speech protections benefit society 
far better than any alternative.24  This article applies these strategies to 
current, difficult free speech scenarios, engaging particular aspects of free 
speech doctrine.   
Part I argues that claims of First Amendment cynicism are overstated, 
particularly the charges against the right of First Amendment Lochnerism 
and charges against the left of abandoning free speech.  Part I also 
demonstrates how the responses to perceived First Amendment cynicism 
may become just as cynical as the problems they address.  Part II then 
disputes the notion that the First Amendment is inherently political.  It 
also explores why the currently dominant civil libertarian tradition is the 
least cynical way to understand the First Amendment, but demonstrates 
 
 24. Those who believe that the First Amendment is valuable insofar as it serves social ends, such 
as the production of truth or the safeguarding of democratic legitimacy, will need convincing that free 
speech is serving its requisite instrumental goals.  See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 690 (“Scholars who 
espouse explicitly consequentialist theories of the First Amendment believe that free speech's value lies 
in advancing particular ends, such as truth or democratic self-
government. These free speech consequentialists argue that speech can and should be suppressed when a 
given instance of speech actually works against those ends, or, more generally, when the benefits of 
that speech are outweighed by other harms.”). Those who believe that free speech is an inherent right of 
autonomous moral agents, such as those who have a deontological view of the First Amendment, id. at 
691, will not need such convincing, although “threshold deontologists” will need to be convinced that free 
speech rights do not cause harm above a certain threshold and thus overpowers our inherent rights. See 
Carol Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death 
Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 756 (2005) (explaining that to threshold deontologists, at “some 
‘threshold’ of catastrophic consequences, categorical moral prohibitions should give way to 
consequentialist concerns.”). 
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where there is room for the “free speech as equality” approach.25  Later, 
Part III offers ways of understanding the First Amendment that can de-
politicize the doctrine without requiring judges to abandon vigorous 
judicial review, and discusses approaches to free speech jurisprudence 
that can be responsive to the poor and powerless without compromising 
viewpoint neutrality. This article applies these insights to issues 
surrounding the Supreme Court’s docket, corporate speech and economic 
regulations generally, and hate speech, especially when promulgated by 
white supremacists. 
I.  FOUNDATIONS AND INACCURACIES OF FIRST AMENDMENT CYNICISM 
Restoring faith in the First Amendment requires a way out of the 
current vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism.  This Part details and 
then disputes the current charges of First Amendment cynicism.  For the 
purposes of this article, “First Amendment cynicism” is defined as the 
purposeful creation or application of free speech doctrine to serve 
political interests unrelated to freedom of expression.  First Amendment 
cynicism can take two forms: (1) using the First Amendment to 
accomplish political goals unrelated to free speech that cannot be 
accomplished through the legislature, and (2) denying application of the 
First Amendment in order to promote interests unrelated to freedom of 
expression.  Although denying application of the First Amendment in 
certain spheres may be perceived as simply balancing free speech rights 
with other interests, this article characterizes this jurisprudential approach 
to free speech as a cynical use in cases where those performing the 
balancing consistently favor certain political or ideological interests that 
match their political preferences. 
The first section in this Part describes the nature of the accusations of 
First Amendment cynicism against judges, scholars, and other individuals 
who span the political and ideological spectra.  The second section then 
argues that these charges, while not frivolous, are overstated and ignore 
the history and evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence.  Indeed, 
some of these charges may reflect second-order First Amendment 
cynicism, where accusations of First Amendment cynicism are 
themselves intended to serve political ends unrelated to freedom of 
expression.26   
 
 25. Kathleen Sullivan develops the often-competing “free speech as liberty” and “free speech as 
equality” approaches to the First Amendment in an essay that explores the polarizing response to Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 144–45. 
 26. There is an infinite regress problem, because accusations of second-order First Amendment 
cynicism may themselves be intended to shape First Amendment doctrine or culture cynically.  
Demonstrably false accusations of second-order First Amendment cynicism may be termed third-order 
First Amendment cynicism—one who vehemently disagrees with this article may label it as an example 
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A. First Amendment Lochnerism and Weaponization by the Right 
Judges and commentators across the political spectrum are 
precipitously losing faith that their political opponents value a 
nonpartisan First Amendment.  Although some critical legal scholars have 
lamented for decades that free speech doctrine cannot be ideologically 
neutral,27 recently, more pointed charges have emerged.  For example, 
accusations by the political left about the political right, which detail the 
“Lochnerization”28or weaponization of the First Amendment to benefit 
specific classes of people or political interests, are increasingly part of the 
mainstream discourse surrounding current free speech doctrine.   
Older versions of progressive critiques of America’s highly protective 
free speech jurisprudence targeted more high-level, philosophical 
approaches to the doctrine and the implications of those approaches.  
These critiques were more abstract and less personal than the current 
charges of First Amendment cynicism.  In the 1990s, for example, Jack 
Balkin provided a compelling explanation for the First Amendment “sea 
change,” where those on the left had begun to abandon their traditionally 
fervent support of a libertarian conception of free speech rights.29  He 
analogized the legal realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, which 
portrayed freedom of contract as not truly “free” due to background 
economic conditions, to a new legal realism targeting when free speech is 
meaningful as a right.30  According to Balkin, those on the left have 
advanced significant arguments that background social and economic 
inequalities deprive certain underprivileged classes of people from having 
equal opportunities to speak, even if First Amendment doctrine is 
formally “free.”31     
 
of third- or even fourth-order First Amendment cynicism.  This article will not embark on a discussion of 
the infinite orders of First Amendment cynicism given how few empirical examples we have of this 
phenomenon, but the infinite possibilities for First Amendment cynicism demonstrates why it is 
imperative to develop ways of exiting the vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism. 
 27. Neutrality is, of course, a difficult and contested concept, and the critical legal movement was 
dedicated to the view that the law can never be neutral. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State 
Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1350-52 (1991) (relating how critiques of 
the liberal concept of neutrality “argue that the liberal state is not neutral at all, but rather uses the rhetoric 
of neutrality to promote, legitimate, and defend a way of life that is built upon class, sex, and race 
inequality”). At a high level of abstraction, the application of legal principles must be considered political 
in that one has to accept our current legal structure and order. At the level of First Amendment doctrine, 
however, I seek to demonstrate that free speech principles can be, at least theoretically, both nonpartisan 
and apolitical. See infra Part II. 
 28. See Shanor, supra note 18; infra Section I.C.   
 29. See Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 376 (1990).   
 30. Id. at 379–80.    
 31. Id. at 380–82 (detailing the feminist argument that “[j]ust as the exchange between employer 
and employee looks free but is actually coerced, so the speech of women and of other groups is not free 
but is actually the result of social forces beyond their control”). 
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These more abstract, philosophical critiques of the meaning, scope, and 
application of free speech doctrine have ripened into something more 
sinister, as both the left and the right are, with mounting vitriol, accusing 
each other of purposely manipulating and misapplying First Amendment 
doctrine to serve political ends.      
Scholars, usually on the political or ideological left, have marshaled 
arguments that the First Amendment, which was supposed to benefit 
those with minority viewpoints and the relatively politically powerless, 
has been co-opted to serve corporate interests.  First Amendment scholar 
Amanda Shanor, for example, argues that corporations have successfully 
deployed a litigating strategy to render the First Amendment more 
receptive to commercial interests.32  These developments, which Shanor 
finds regrettable, were in part effectuated by “well-organized business 
actors and conservative movement lawyers acting in a multifaceted 
approach over decades to influence the meaning and constitutional 
salience of free speech protections.”33     
According to Shanor, the commercial speech doctrine, of relatively 
recent advent, was originally “forged as a tool of consumer protection to 
secure the value of commercial speech to society, not to ensure the 
autonomy interests of commercial speakers.”  However, the doctrine has 
expanded to encompass a speaker-based right of businesses.34  In some 
courts of appeals, corporations may even be able to fight the compulsion 
of commercial speech as if it were akin to the suppression of commercial 
speech.35    Especially during a time where “soft” regulation happens 
mostly through mechanisms that resemble compelled speech, such as 
disclosure requirements, the expansive “commercial speech doctrine” 
allows corporations to exploit free speech protections to serve as a 
powerful “deregulatory engine.”36  In essence, the doctrine has been 
perverted from its original purpose and scope, and corporations are 
partially to blame.          
More broadly, many scholars believe that the First Amendment, instead 
of being used a metaphorical shield to defend against censorship, is being 
 
 32. See Shanor, supra note 18, at 135 (“[A] largely business-led social movement has mobilized 
to embed libertarian-leaning understandings of the First Amendment in constitutional jurisprudence.”). 
 33. Id. at 163. 
 34. Id. at 150–51. 
 35. Id. at 145–52 (“Commercial plaintiffs have mounted cases against economic regulations 
ranging from the more quotidian -- such as tour guide licensing, required country-of-origin labels on meat 
products, and a prohibition on the sale of guns at a county fair -- to laws implicating weightier matters 
such as public health and foreign affairs -- including the Food and Drug Administration's graphic cigarette 
warnings, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's ban on the off-label promotion of drugs, and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s required reporting of whether a company's products contain minerals 
sourced from the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”). 
 36. Id. at 134. Shanor’s article traces the development of commercial speech doctrine to explain 
its current clash with the administrative state. Id. at 137.   
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used as a sword to strike down all manner of progressive regulation in 
favor of more conservative approaches to economic and social policy.37  
Attorney and scholar Morgan Weiland chronicles how the expansion of 
speech rights have produced a new First Amendment theory that she calls 
“thin autonomy,” which is contrary to the traditional liberal and 
republican conceptions of free speech.38  According to Weiland, the 
liberal conception of free speech, which emphasizes personal autonomy 
for individuals,39 and the republican conception of free speech, which 
focuses on how First Amendment protections can serve the democracy 
and public good,40 have been subordinated to a libertarian understanding 
of the free speech right that is simply a “naked right against the state.”41  
Giving free speech rights to corporations does not serve individual 
autonomy, because corporations do not have individual autonomy 
interests, nor does it benefit the public at large. 
Even Supreme Court Justices have begun to make pointed accusations 
about the perversion of First Amendment doctrine.  For example, in Janus 
v. ACSFME,42 the majority overturned precedent to hold that public sector 
unions cannot constitutionally require non-union members to contribute 
agency fees to support a union’s collective bargaining activities, because 
agency fees mandate the compelled subsidization of private speech on 
matters of public concern.43  Justice Kagan, in dissent, accused the 
Justices in the majority of demeaning the majesty of the First Amendment 
in order to use it to suit their own political preferences—in this case, 
defunding public sector unions.  Powerfully, Justice Kagan excoriated the 
majority’s dismissal of longstanding precedent and disruption of workers’ 
ability to organize.44 
There is no sugarcoating today’s opinion. The majority overthrows a 
decision entrenched in this Nation’s law—and in its economic life—for 
over 40 years. As a result, it prevents the American people, acting through 
their state and local officials, from making important choices about 
workplace governance. And it does so by weaponizing the First 
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to 
 
    37.  According to Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus v. ACFSME, “the majority has chosen the 
winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and 
regulatory policy.”   138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 38. Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant 
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1396–97 (2007). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1395. 
 41. Id. at 1397. 
 42. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 43. Id. at 2464. 
 44. Id. at 2501 (Kagain, J., dissenting). 
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intervene in economic and regulatory policy.45 
Previously, in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Justice Breyer also compared an 
expansive First Amendment ruling with deregulatory implications to 
Lochner v. New York, an “anticanonical”46 case considered to be an 
example of judicial overreach in inventing constitutional rights in order 
to judicially mandate economic policy.47  Sorrell invalidated, on First 
Amendment grounds, a state law restricting the sale and disclosure of 
doctors’ prescribing practices.48   
Of course, Justices throughout history have accused each other of 
ignoring the Constitution in favor of their own policy preferences, 
including in First Amendment cases.  The dissent even did so in the much-
celebrated West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,49 which 
held that public school students cannot be forced to salute the flag.50  But 
recent attacks, by both Supreme Court Justices, scholars, and members of 
society, are particularly powerful due to their pointedness and due to our 
current state of political polarization.51  The judiciary generally, including 
the confirmations process, has become far more polarized.52  Because free 
speech requires buy-in about its principled application, and because our 
society is currently so polarized, these accusations of First Amendment 
cynicism have become political in a way that could undermine First 
Amendment rights. 
B. Left-Leaning Disrespect For and Cynical Approach to Free Speech  
As the political right expands free speech in ways the left finds cynical, 
the right has accused the left of attempting to undo or reshape free speech 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Jamal Greene, The Anticannon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2011) (including Lochner 
v. New York in the anticannon, a set of decisions that are universally agreed upon as the worst Supreme 
Court cases with the most indefensible central premises). 
 47. Id. at 418–19 (“It is error, on this view, for judges to invalidate democratically enacted statutes 
based on their subjective moral or political preferences rather than on the values authoritatively codified 
in the Constitution.”). 
 48. 564 U.S. 552, 585 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Central Hudson v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).  
 49. 319 U.S. 624, 665-66 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 642. See also Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy Of Barnette, 13 FIU 
L. REV. 639, 642 (2019) (discussing how the dissent accused the majority of using the Constitution to 
enact its policy preferences).  
 51. See Jack Balkin, The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding the Cycles of Constitutional 
Time, 94 IND. L.J. 253, 258 (2019)  (describing and citing studies to demonstrate why our current political 
and constitutional moment is one of “peak polarization”). 
 52. See Richard L. Hansen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261 (2019) 
(arguing that increasing polarization of the citizenry has led to an increasingly polarized judicial selection 
process, increasing polarization of judicial decision-making, and an increasing partisanship to the public’s 
assessment of judges and judicial opinions). 
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protections in ways that appear extreme and polarized, or, at least, self-
serving.  The accusation from the right is that those on the left, often 
academics or university students more so than judges, either wish to 
weaponize the First Amendment to serve progressive causes or seek to 
stop its obvious and fair application to serve their own causes.     
Indeed, the Columbia Law Review recently hosted a symposium on 
how free speech can better combat inequality.  The symposium’s scholars 
tackled the inequalities created by the current “‘Lochnerian’ turn in First 
Amendment doctrine.”53  However, this type of symposium also 
contributes to a view, among many on the right, that those on the political 
or ideological left advocate for cynical uses of the First Amendment.  
Instead of caring about a principled application of free speech doctrine, 
these scholars wish to use free speech doctrine as a means to facilitate 
progress on their pet issue—inequality, defined with a particularly left-
leaning valence.  Indeed, the Introduction offers, as an alternative to First 
Amendment Locherism, “a First Amendment that would advance, rather 
than obstruct or remain indifferent to, the pursuit of social and economic 
equality.”   
The symposium explored ideas regarding both about how to craft more 
robust First Amendment doctrine to serve particular causes,54 and how to 
ensure the First Amendment doesn’t reach sectors these scholars desire to 
regulate.55  This project does not necessarily reflect First Amendment 
cynicism if the scholars genuinely believe that the First Amendment’s 
proper scope should be limited or expanded in this way based on doctrinal 
coherence, text, history, or free speech policy.  Perhaps the project also 
does not reflect First Amendment cynicism if the authors simply wish to 
negate what they perceive as free speech overreach in a way that tends to 
increase economic and social inequality. 
However, the scholars’ primary interests often appear to be 
affirmatively advancing political and social justice aims, and free speech 
doctrine often seems a mere means to those aims.  That approach does fit 
into the category of First Amendment cynicism.  Of course, equality as 
the goal of a legal system is a broader, more justifiable, and less political 
aim than, for example, defunding unions or economic de-regulation.  But 
 
 53. Symposium, A First Amendment for All: Free Expression in an Age of Inequality, 118 COLUM. 
L. REV. i (2018) (defining “‘Lochnerian’ turn” as “the use of the First Amendment to entrench social and 
economic hierarchy.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as 
Prologue, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2076 (2018) (arguing in favor of expanding First Amendment 
doctrine substantially to cover labor picketing and boycotts). 
 55. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2032-33 
(2018) (arguing that the First Amendment should not prevent regulation of social media platforms in order 
to increase consumers “practical freedom” at the expense of concentrated media companies’ potential free 
speech rights). 
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the types of equality discussed, and discussed as a broad grouping, reflect 
a progressive ideology of equality of outcome instead of equality of 
opportunity, and favor certain types of equality over liberty, reflecting 
views at the left of center on the political spectrum.   
Other accusations from the right are that, in less sophisticated ways 
than their professor counterparts, some vocal university students chant 
their disrespect for free speech or aim to shut down speech when speakers 
with objectionable views come to their campuses.56  Shouting down or 
disrupting speakers is not a problem unique to the political left, but some 
on the left with progressive views have come to perceive the First 
Amendment as so antithetical to progressive causes such as equality 
(which they may care more about than free speech) that they are willing 
to abandon the idea of a principled First Amendment, which serves even 
objectionable speech, altogether.  Even at law schools, where free, open, 
and civil debate is a necessity for a well-rounded academic education in 
the legal profession, students have shut down mainstream conservative 
speakers for espousing views, even views about free speech, which they 
find objectionable.57  Many on the political right believe that the left has 
abandoned free speech, cynically, in favor of their own pet political 
causes, but then wish to benefit from free speech when it suits their own 
political interests. 
Perhaps the left has polarized against the right’s actual or perceived 
misuses of the First Amendment.  Free speech may be used as a pretext 
for white supremacy.  Indeed, the organizer of the white supremacist 
Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, who claimed to be a champion of 
free speech values, sued a woman for swearing at him.58  In the minds of 
many on the left, unfortunately, free speech as a pretext for upholding 
racist values has been solidified.   
As a result of this dynamic, many believe that the left is also now 
contributing to First Amendment cynicism in a way that produces greater 
polarity between both sides of the political spectrum.  The ACLU, famous 
 
 56. See Stanley Kurtz, Year of the Shout Down: It Was Worse Than You Think, NAT’L REV.(May 
31, 2017 1:48 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/year-shout-down-worse-you-think-campus-
free-speech/. For a description of the destructive protests at the University of California, Berkeley, see 
Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163, 2165–
66 (2018) (“One of the justifications for the violent protest in response to the University of California, 
Berkeley's hosting of alt-right speaker Milo Yiannopoulos was that his speech is so threatening and 
silencing to minority groups that their only recourse is to respond with violence.”). 
 57. See Scott Jaschik, Shutting Down Talk on Campus Free Speech, INSIDE HIGHER ED (April 16, 
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/16/guest-lecture-free-speech-cuny-law-school-
heckled (reporting and linking to video where students at CUNY Law School chanted over Professor Josh 
Blackman’s guest lecture on free speech). 
 58. Matt Novak, Judge Awards $5 to Free Speech Rally Organizer Because a Woman Cursed at 
Him, GIZMODO (July 2, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/judge-awards-5-to-free-speech-rally-organizer-
because-1827280858. 
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for representing clients like neo-Nazis who wished to march in Skokie, 
Illinois, a town populated by many Holocaust survivors, is rethinking its 
approach to so-called “hate speech” cases.59  The  Skokie case “has come 
to symbolize the ACLU's nonpartisan, evenhanded defense 
of constitutional rights,”60 but the ACLU has changed its stance with 
respect to armed protesters who represent hate groups.61 A leaked internal 
memo by ACLU staff members outlines the factors the ACLU will use 
when deciding whether to take a case, including  
the (present and historical) context of the proposed speech; the potential 
effect on marginalized communities; the extent to which the speech may 
assist in advancing the goals of white supremacists or others whose views 
are contrary to our values; and the structural and power inequalities in the 
community in which the speech will occur.62   
These changed approaches may simply reflect the more dangerous nature 
of certain types of protesters, but the ACLU, which now champions 
causes that seem more politically left-leaning and are unrelated to the 
classic understanding of “liberty,” must balance other interests against a 
principled defense of free speech.63   
  These accusations of left-leaning First Amendment cynicism are 
serious, but, as described in the next section, they are also overstated, 
which may have even more serious consequences.   
C. Allegations of First Amendment Cynicism Are Overstated and 
Ahistorical 
An important first step in combating actual First Amendment cynicism 
is demonstrating that perceptions of First Amendment cynicism are 
overstated.  The left’s and the right’s visions of free speech diverge, but 
not as sharply or as crassly as critics contend.  Many of the loci of 
disagreement involve issues where reasonable minds can differ.  Further, 
although the form of the accusations has become more pointed, charges 
 
 59. See Dara Lind, Why the ACLU Is Adjusting Its Approach to Free Speech After Charlottesville, 
VOX (Aug. 21, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.vox.com/2017/8/20/16167870/aclu-hate-speech-nazis-
charlottesville (describing how “[t]he ACLU seemed like it was in the midst of a partial reinvention as an 
explicitly progressive organization for the Donald Trump era”).   
 60. David Cole, Are You Now or Have you Ever Been a Member of the ACLU, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
1404, 1417 (1992). 
 61. After the deadly rally in Charlottesville, where a white supremacist attending to rally killed 
protester Heather Heyer, the ACLU’s President Anthony Romero issued a statement that the ACLU would 
no longer defend the free speech rights of those who wish to march carrying firearms.  Lind, supra note 
59. 
 62. See Robby Soave, Leaked Internal Memo Reveals ACLU is Wavering on Free Speech, REASON 
(June 23, 2018 8:25 AM), https://reason.com/blog/2018/06/21/aclu-leaked-memo-free-speech. 
 63. See Goldberg, supra note 16 (arguing that the ACLU is abandoning its traditional protection 
of civil liberties in favor of supporting various civil rights causes).  
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of First Amendment Lochnerism are not new.  The connection between 
free speech rights and economic deregulation has a long pedigree and may 
be inseverable.  In addition, many of the doctrines the left now criticizes 
originated from liberal jurists, demonstrating the political malleability—
a feature, not a bug—of the First Amendment.  Many on both the left and 
the right continue to advance arguments in favor of a principled free 
speech jurisprudence without regard to the content of speech or the 
political result of protecting particular speech.  Finally, some of the 
accusations against both the right and the left for First Amendment 
cynicism may reflect second-order First Amendment cynicism, to the 
extent they are either demonstrably false or are intended pretextually to 
achieve political ends unrelated to freedom of expression.     
1. The Left’s and Right’s Principled Divergences 
Much of the difference between the right’s and the left’s approach to 
free speech reflects two different visions of the First Amendment, one 
where free speech serves political equality and one where free speech 
serves political liberty.64  As constitutional law expert Kathleen Sullivan 
articulates, in the “free speech as equality” conception, marginalized 
groups deserve extra solicitude from the government, which cannot 
discriminate when subsidizing speech or allowing speech on public 
land.65   However, wealthy corporations deserve no special treatment.66  
In the “free speech as liberty” conception, the First Amendment serves to 
prevent governmental tyranny, or the suppression of speech based on the 
state’s sense of what is good instead of the “private ordering of ideas.”67  
In many cases, these two conceptions overlap,68 leading to wide victories 
for litigants claiming First Amendment protections.69  
By contrast, Citizens United v FEC,70 a case that sharply divided 
conservatives and liberals both on and off the Court,71 reflects the 
 
 64. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 144–45. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 145. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 144 n.9 (discussing classes of cases where the “free speech as equality” and “free speech 
as liberty” concepts align).   
 69. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (invalidating provisions of the Lanham Act 
forbidding the trademarking of disparaging terms); Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) 
(overturning conviction based on law that banned sex offenders from access to particular types of social 
media); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (overturning damages award for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress based on protest of military funeral by controversial religious group); United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (invalidating ban on depictions of animal cruelty). 
 70. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating federal law restricting expenditures on political campaign-
related speech by corporations, including non-profit corporation that produced the documentary at issue). 
 71. The Court’s 5-4 decision did not fall entirely on partisan lines, as dissenter Justice Stevens was 
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differences in these two approaches, despite the fact that Justices in both 
the majority and the dissent embraced both of these visions, in some 
form.72  Ultimately, the majority in Citizens United believed antithetical 
to the First Amendment the “affirmative action for marginal speech”73 
notions underlying the alternative approach.  The necessary result of the 
antidistortion rationale espoused by Justice Stevens’ partial concurrence 
and dissent is that powerful speakers such as corporations, can be silenced 
to make room for other voices.74  Justice Kennedy’s majority found this 
at intractable odds with First Amendment jurisprudence.75  Further, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority and Justice Stevens’s partial concurrence and 
dissent disagreed on whether there was a compelling need to restrict 
campaign expenditures.76  Reasonable minds can disagree on which 
approach is more consistent with First Amendment theory and 
jurisprudence, and whether prohibiting campaign expenditures is 
necessary to mitigate political corruption.  The next Part discusses why 
free speech as liberty is more consistent with a nonpartisan First 
Amendment, but it suffices here to note that both the majority and the 
dissent articulated coherent views of freedom of speech, despite the later 
politicization of the case.77   
Of course, any given Justice, scholar, or member of society may select 
his or her abstract approach to free speech doctrine—either free speech as 
liberty or free speech as equality—based on how that approach will affect 
preferred outcomes.  That may be what happened in Janus v. AFSCME,78 
where Court split entirely on partisan lines, and the majority invalidated 
 
appointed by Gerald Ford.   However, Justice Stevens is considered to be a judicial liberal.  See Matthew 
Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 
801, 831 (2009) (“Justice Stevens was appointed by President Ford, but is now the most liberal member 
of the Supreme Court.”).  The author agrees with Kathleen Sullivan that “[w]hile the labels ‘liberal’ and 
‘conservative’ are reductive and sometimes incoherent as descriptions of the Justices’ approaches to 
constitutional decisionmaking, they have become pervasive in popular accounts of the Court and in 
attempts to quantify its outcomes”).  Sullivan, supra note 15, at 144 n.7.  
 72. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 145 (“Neither vision, however, entirely eclipses the other in Citizens 
United; each of the principal opinions pays lip service to the other by invoking the other's theory in its 
own cause.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. According to the majority, “[i]f the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it 
would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has 
taken on the corporate form.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Compare id. at 357 (“Limits on independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a chilling 
effect extending well beyond the Government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The 
anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”) with id. at 442 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (discussing “the need to confront the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electoral 
advocacy financed by general treasury dollars”). 
 77. See Sullivan, supra note 15. 
 78. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
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mandatory public sector union dues as impermissible compelled speech.79 
Results-driven reasoning is a risk in all aspects of constitutional law, and 
all law in general.  We should be vigilant to ensure Justices do not proffer 
pretextual opinions, and we should establish a constitutional culture 
where judges feel obligated to explain their theories of jurisprudence in 
broader terms to demonstrate their internal coherence and fidelity to the 
rule of law.  However, currently, we can test Justices and commentators 
only on the coherence of their approaches and the consistency in 
application of those approaches.  Justice Kagan’s claim that the First 
Amendment was “weaponiz[ed]” in Janus,80 for example, should require 
a much greater indication that the Justices have departed from either their 
views of stare decisis (as Janus overruled a portion of Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education)81 or a greater indication that Janus is inconsistent 
with the majority’s approach to First Amendment law more generally.   
Although Justice Kagan, in the Janus dissent, claimed that “[t]he First 
Amendment was meant for better things,”82 the majority, explicitly, at 
least, believed it was vindicating an important principle, encapsulated in 
a quote by Thomas Jefferson, that “to compel a man to furnish 
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical.”83  Justice Kagan has a 
notion of democracy, much like free speech as equality, in which the state 
can intervene to allow citizens to more effectively access democratic 
institutions.84  Justice Alito’s view aligns with the free speech as liberty 
approach.  Plus, like in Citizens United, Janus itself may boil down to a 
fight over compelling interest analysis.  The majority thought free rider 
problems, where individuals can be represented by unions without paying 
dues were not a sufficient compelling interest,85 whereas Justice Kagan’s 
dissent believed the government was justified in believing that “agency 
fees are necessary for exclusive representation to work.”86  Although it is 
convenient that perhaps all of the Janus Justices’ compelling-interest 
analysis aligns with their political views, those views may have colored 
what was already a reasonable approach instead of directing the Justices 
to a disingenuous or unreasonable interpretation of the Constitution.  
Other disagreements that appear to manifest First Amendment 
 
 79. Id. at 2486–87. 
 80. Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 81. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 82. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 2464 (majority opinion) (quoting A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) (emphasis omitted and footnote omitted)). 
 84. Id. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment “was meant not to 
undermine but to protect democratic governance—including over the role of public-sector unions”). 
 85. Id. at 2466 (majority opinion).  
 86. Id. at 2490 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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cynicism may also reflect underlying doctrinal differences that are not 
entirely political in nature.  The right and the left also sometimes disagree 
about whether restrictions on speech should be considered equally 
problematic as compelled speech.  According to Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion in Janus, compelling speech is worse than restricting speech 
because in addition to interfering with the private marketplace of ideas, 
“individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions.”87   This 
divergence on how to treat compelled speech has recently arisen in 
commercial speech cases involving mandatory disclosure provisions, 
because many believe disclosure requirements on corporations are benign 
and simply add information to the actual marketplace.88   
There is a significant argument that doctrines affording commercial 
speech First Amendment protections, originally developed by liberal 
jurists to vindicate listeners’ rights, have been perverted to benefit 
corporate interests.89  But the very fact that the current protections for 
corporations evolved from the commercial speech doctrine, “as one facet 
of a progressively led rights revolution”90 aimed at consumer protection,91 
demonstrates how apolitical the First Amendment still is, can be, and 
should be.92  Although it is true that listener’s rights have, to some degree, 
merged with the free speech rights of corporate speakers,93 this is not 
necessarily an indication of First Amendment cynicism.  Protecting the 
ability of the corporation to speak also protects against governmental 
ordering of what the listener may hear, consistent with the free speech as 
liberty vision, even if not with the free speech as equality vision.  
Some scholars see cases like Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,94 which 
invalidated a state law restricting the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy 
 
 87. Id. at 2464 (majority opinion).  
 88. Shanor, supra note 18, at 152–53 (contending that although the Supreme Court treats 
compelled commercial speech as a lesser constitutional problem than restrictions on commercial speech, 
“some circuit court decisions have not been so clear”).  
 89. Weiland, supra note 38, at 1433 (“[B]ecause corporate speech rights are clearly vindicated by 
the Court’s deregulatory move [in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 773 (1976)], while it is not at all clear whether listeners' rights are similarly upheld, the Court 
arguably began to use listeners' rights as an instrumental one-way deregulatory ratchet.”). 
 90. Shanor, supra note 18, at 142. 
 91. Id. at 143 (“The commercial speech doctrine was forged as a tool of consumer protection to 
secure the value of commercial speech to society, not to ensure the autonomy interests of commercial 
speakers.”). 
 92. Id. (“The doctrinal revolution in commercial speech came over the strenuous opposition of the 
Court's conservatives.”). 
 93. According to Weiland, in commercial speech cases, “the Court radically transformed listeners’ 
rights from how they are understood in the republican tradition, reconceptualizing listeners as individuals 
with an interest in the ‘free flow of information.’ It purported to vindicate those rights through 
deregulatory rulings, the same mechanism that benefits corporate speech rights.” Weiland, supra note 38, 
at 1430. 
 94. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
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records on the prescribing practices of doctors without their consent,95 as 
expanding protections for commercial speech too far.96 But the case also 
shows that the First Amendment benefits speakers and listeners regardless 
of identity, and no one political approach can win under the First 
Amendment.  The view that corporations should not be discriminated 
against as one type of speaker, a view that divided the left and the right in 
Citizens United v. FEC, is eminently justifiable, even if debatable.     
2. The Historical Interaction of Free Speech Rights and Economic 
Liberties 
 As detailed in the previous subsection, interpretations by scholars and 
jurists on the right and left often reflect principled disagreements about 
the nature of the free speech right.  In addition, there is far more political 
fluidity in the doctrine than can be captured in simple left/right 
dichotomies.  As historian and legal scholar Jeremy Kessler 
comprehensively chronicles, free speech liberties and economic de-
regulation have long been intertwined,97 often based on the jurisprudence 
of liberal Supreme Court Justices.   
Originally, media companies fought for free speech rights to publish 
objectionable content and fought against licensing taxes.98  Many of the 
earliest victories for free speech were won by newspapers, often 
represented by “corporate lawyers tasked with fending off New Deal 
economic regulation,” and specifically a trade group controlled by 
newspaper chains.99  In Near v. Minnesota, for example, the Court held 
that despite a newspaper’s operating as a business, which could be viewed 
as conduct instead of speech, the press has a right against prior restraint 
to publish information about corrupt public officials, even if it might have 
previously published scandalous or defamatory information.100  In 
 
 95. Id. at 563–64 (holding that Vermont’s law imposed impermissible content- and speaker- based 
restrictions on speech). 
 96. According to Shanor, because the commercial speech doctrine was intended to give some, but 
lesser, protection to commercial speech, restrictions on commercial speech are necessarily content based.  
Shanor, supra note 18, at 151. The Court missteps, then, when it strikes down regulations on commercial 
speech because they are content based. Id.   
 97. Kessler, supra note 18, at 1925 (“While certainly not the dominant trend in First Amendment 
jurisprudence, judicial suspicion of economic regulations that incidentally restrict the exercise of First 
Amendment rights-- even when that exercise takes the form of commercial activity--has a long doctrinal 
pedigree . . . .”). 
 98. Id. at 1925–26. 
 99. Id. at 1925. 
 100. 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931) (“In attempted justification of the statute, it is said that it deals not 
with publication per se, but with the ‘business' of publishing defamation. If, however, the publisher has a 
constitutional right to publish, without previous restraint, an edition of his newspaper charging official 
derelictions, it cannot be denied that he may publish subsequent editions for the same purpose.”). 
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Grosjean v. American Press Co., the Court held that taxes on newspapers 
with high circulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.101  
The Supreme Court recognized that the power to tax, or interfere with the 
running of a business, could have dramatic First Amendment 
implications. 
Then, furthering the connection between civil and economic liberties, 
the “peddling tax” cases invalidated laws requiring taxes on the 
distribution and sale of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious literature, despite 
the fact that the taxes applied to commerce generally.102  Jurists began to 
notice a “basic, structural antagonism between judicial civil 
libertarianism and judicial deference to political regulation of the 
economy.”103  Part of the tension was created by the famous Carolene 
Products Footnote Four, which gave special status to enumerated 
constitutional rights, as above economic regulation.104 “Successful 
attempts to shore up the logic of bifurcated review—to formulate a 
workable distinction between judicial defense of civil liberty and judicial 
supervision of the economy—have been few and far between in the courts 
and in the academy.”105  Even many liberal “Justices rather saw a free 
market in particular goods and services (the sale of religious magazines, 
the advertisement of abortion services) as inextricable from the free 
market in self-expression and self-determination that they sought to 
vindicate.”106   
Thus, according to Kessler, scholars today have an unduly narrow 
sense of First Amendment Lochnerism, which has a long history that is 
far more politically complex and broader than the narrative of 
conservative Justices wishing to strike down economic regulations to 
benefit corporate interests.107  Kessler’s presentation of this history of the 
First Amendment is not intended to justify the state of the doctrine.  
Instead, he believes that those seeking First Amendment reforms will 
have to challenge wider swaths of the doctrine and resort to legislative 
solutions to gain political control of the economy.108  The entanglement 
 
 101. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
 102. Kessler, supra note 18, at 1957–59. 
 103. Id. at 1976. 
 104. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (“There may be narrower scope 
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. “); see also Kessler, supra note 18, at 
1919 (discussing the danger of Carolene Products Footnote 4 to economic regulations). 
 105. Kessler, supra note 18, at 2003–04. 
 106. Id. at 2000. 
 107. Id. at 2000 (“This definition of Lochnerism . . . adopted by many contemporary critics of First 
Amendment Lochnerism, has worked to obscure the long-term, economically libertarian tendencies of 
aggressive judicial enforcement of the First Amendment.”). 
 108. Id. at 2003 (“In light of this longer history, critics of 
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of free speech rights and economic liberties is well entrenched in the 
doctrine, often perpetuated by “liberal judges as activists.”109 
3. First Amendment Lochnerism Forever 
Indeed, even the term “First Amendment Lochnerism” has been around 
for quite some time.  This analogy, which is usually, although not 
always,110 meant to reproach, has been invoked in a variety of contexts, 
not all dealing with instances where constitutional rights trump economic 
restrictions.  Donald Livey chided the Court’s entire First Amendment 
scheme of protecting only certain speech as embracing “a first 
amendment variant of Lochnerism” in the 1980s.111  This early accusation 
of First Amendment Lochnerism contended that the Court protects speech 
based on its own policy preferences; for example, it excludes obscenity 
and fighting words from free speech protections based on its own 
subjective conception of value.112   
First Amendment Lochnerism was also discussed in relation to the 
Court’s protection of hate speech in the 1990s, and the Court’s blurring 
of the line between speech and conduct.113  Other scholars have invoked 
the term when discussing specific cases, such as a case invalidating 
criminal sanctions for those who publish intercepted communications 
between union members,114 or the case involving burning of draft cards, 
which established the expressive conduct paradigm,115 where expressive 
conduct receives some First Amendment scrutiny but more easily passes 
constitutional review than pure speech.116  The current charges of First 
 
contemporary First Amendment Lochnerism might be wise to abandon their defense of an illusory 
tradition of economically neutral First Amendment enforcement. Instead, they could take up the banner 
of radical reform and seek to break with a legal tradition that has long been insensitive to the tension 
between judicial civil libertarianism and judicial deference to economic regulation.”). 
 109. Id. at 2001–02. 
 110. For an article criticizing the use of the term as strictly a pejorative, see Howard Wasserman, 
Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV.421, 423 (2006) 
(“The pejorative nature of the term ultimately serves to obscure meaningful substantive constitutional 
dialogue about the meaning of the freedom of speech and how that freedom should be balanced against 
competing constitutional, political, and social values.”). 
 111. Donald E. Livey, The Sometimes Relevant First Amendment, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 881, 883 (1987). 
 112. Id. at 884–85. 
 113. Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without 
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 110–15 (1993). 
 114. Wasserman, supra note 110, at 423 (comparing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 519 (2001) with 
Lochner). 
 115. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 771 
(2001) (comparing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), with Lochner). 
 116. According to the Court, expressive conduct, like the burning of a draft card, involves elements 
of speech and non-speech. Unlike restrictions on pure speech, which receive strict scrutiny, restrictions 
on expressive conduct receive intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (“[A] 
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; 
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Amendment Lochnerism, which are more pointed and repeated in greater 
stereo, may simply be another wave of criticisms of the interpretation of 
an amendment that does not give great guidance to courts and will 
necessarily create discord in its application.  Thus, the perception of First 
Amendment cynicism may be stronger among the current public, but that 
does not necessarily reflect historical reality of actual or perceived 
instances of First Amendment cynicism. 
4. Misrepresenting the Left’s Abandonment of Free Speech 
The previous subparts mainly refute the accusations, made by the left 
against the right, of First Amendment cynicism that takes the forms of 
First Amendment Lochnerism and weaponization of free speech doctrine.  
There is also good reason to believe that the accusations by the right 
against the left, largely in the form that the left has abandoned a robust, 
principled reading of the First Amendment, are overstated, and may 
themselves reflect second-order First Amendment cynicism.117   
Undermining accusations of First Amendment cynicism from the right 
about the left, many university students and progressives still strongly 
believe in free speech, but simply want to devote their energy to other 
causes or to acknowledge those hurt by speech.118  Those who wish to 
heckle speakers appear to simply be a vocal, and virulent, minority.119  
There is some evidence that the “campus free speech crisis” is 
improving.120  Plus, many who appear to have abandoned a viewpoint-
neutral, robust free speech regime offer views about free speech that echo 
the older legal realist critiques of the 1990s, although those critiques have 
morphed and become less sophisticated once they entered the realm of 
general public discourse.   
Further, there is some evidence that those on the right, who are quite 
dismayed by the perceived campus free speech crisis, have little regard 
for free speech in other important areas, especially when the speech is 
not conservative in orientation.  The right’s horror at the left’s 
 
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).  
 117. See infra Section I.C.5. 
 118. See Anthony L. Fisher, The Free Speech Problem on Campus is Real.  It Ultimately Hurts 
Dissidents, VOX (Jan. 2, 2017 8:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/13/13931524/free-
speech-pen-america-campus-censorship. 
 119. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Free Speech at Brown (Again), INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 7, 2013), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/11/07/brown-u-president-calls-broad-review-lecture-was-
shouted-down (poll in Brown University newspaper indicated that while many disagreed with police 
commissioner speaker, they did not support those who shouted him down).   
 120. See Jeffrey Adam Sachs, The “Campus Free Speech Crisis” Ended Last Year, NIKANSEN CTR. 
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-campus-free-speech-crisis-ended-last-year/. 
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abandonment of free speech may thus be self-serving.  As one 
example, some politicians suggesting legislation to combat disruptive 
protests on college campuses also wish to penalize those who engage 
in protest boycotts of products made by Israeli companies, by limiting 
the ability of those who participate in the Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanctions movement to contract with state governments.121  As another 
example, many state legislatures, generally representing conservative 
interests, have enacted laws penalizing animal welfare activists or 
investigative journalists from accessing farm facilities based on false 
premises.122  Several courts have deemed aspects of these so-called 
“ag-gag” laws unconstitutional.123   
Of course, the constitutional status of boycotts is uncertain,124 and 
is far more complex than the right to speak at a university if invited by 
a recognized student group.125 Further, the conservatives decrying 
liberals’ disregard for free speech may not be the same ones trying to 
implement ag-gag laws, which may be motivated by a principled, 
viewpoint-neutral desire to protect property rights.  However, these 
examples offer at least some evidence that some who appear most 
vocal about campus free speech concerns may be engaging in second-
order First Amendment cynicism—accusations of First Amendment 
cynicism intended to accomplish a political agenda unrelated to 
sincerely held, principled views about freedom of speech.      
5. Second-Order First Amendment Cynicism 
Any given accusation of First Amendment cynicism may itself be a 
cynical reflection of the political motives of the accuser and not a 
 
 121. Lee Fang & Zaid Jilani, Politicians Campaign on Free Speech While Voting to Punish Those 
Who Boycott Israel, INTERCEPT (Mar. 14, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/14/campus-free-
speech-bds-israel-boycott/. 
 122. Brandon Keim, Ag-Gag Laws Could Make America Sick, WIRED, (May 2, 2013), 
https://www.wired.com/2013/05/ag-gag-public-health/; Esha Bhandari, Court Rules ‘Ag-Gag’ Law 
Criminalizing Undercover Reporting Violates the First Amendment, ACLU.org (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/freedom-press/court-rules-ag-gag-law-criminalizing-undercover-
reporting-violates.  
 123. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding 
unconstitutional laws criminalizing entry into an agricultural facility by misrepresentation, but upholding 
laws criminalizing gaining access to records or employment through misrepresentation); Animal Legal 
Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F.Supp.3d 1193 (D. Utah 2017). 
 124. See Erica Goldberg, Federal Courts Examining BDS Movement Boycott Restrictions, 
CROWDED THEATER (Apr. 23, 2019), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2019/04/23/federal-courts-
examining-bds-movement-boycott-restrictions/. 
 125. See Erica Goldberg, Must Universities “Subsidize” Controversial Ideas: Allocating Security 
Fees When Student Groups Host Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 349, 373–74 (2011) 
(describing case law that heavily scrutinizes university decisions that deny access to student groups use 
of campus facilities and viewpoint-based discrimination against speech by student organizations). 
24
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/1
2020] FIRST AMENDMENT CYNICISM AND REDEMPTION 983 
principled defense of a particular interpretation of the First Amendment.  
An accusation of this kind would then constitute second-order First 
Amendment  cynicism.  However, accusations of second-order cynicism 
may themselves be cynical, intended to undermine legitimate accusations 
of First Amendment cynicism.  As a result, there is an infinite regress 
issue.126 When considering second-order First Amendment cynicism, or 
accusations of second-order First Amendment cynicism, the vicious cycle 
gets ever more vicious.   
In a universe consisting solely of first-order First Amendment 
cynicism, perceptions by the left of first-order First Amendment cynicism 
by the right may lead those on the left to also interpret free speech 
protections cynically, and when the right perceives this, it may follow 
suit, perpetuating a vicious cycle.  With second-order First Amendment 
cynicism, accusations of First Amendment cynicism—themselves 
perhaps disingenuous—cause the target of the accusation to lose faith in 
a principled free speech regime because those who seem most vocal about 
speaking in favor of free speech protections (or those in favor of prudent 
limitations on free speech that are consistent with the Constitution) are 
doing so cynically.  This loss of faith then leads to more First Amendment 
cynicism by those falsely accused of first-order cynicism, continuing the 
cycle, or perhaps even to accusations of second-order cynicism that the 
target perceives as cynical.   
As one example, many on the left believe that the right has 
manufactured a campus free speech crisis, in which the right is accusing 
the left of not caring about free speech when in fact many vocal 
proponents of free speech on the right simply wish to use “free speech 
martyrdom” as an effective pretext.127  What the left sees from the right 
as false accusations of First Amendment cynicism (or second-order First 
Amendment cynicism), the right sees as genuine allegations of actual 
cynicism, accusations that the left can evade by claiming these 
accusations of First Amendment cynicism are, in actuality, second-order 
First Amendment cynicism.      
Exiting this infinitely recursive cycle of First Amendment cynicism, 
which can be infinitely recursive, is difficult because there is no “true” 
First Amendment by which we can measure people’s interpretations of 
free speech protections.  We can, however, examine whether an 
 
 126. See supra note 24. 
 127. See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, The Mistake the Berkeley Protesters Made About Milo Yiannopoulos, 
NEW YORKER (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-mistake-the-
berkeley-protesters-made-about-milo-yiannopoulos. According to Jelani Cobb, Milo Yiannopoulos, 
whose anticipated speech at University of California, Berkeley caused violent and disruptive protests, “is 
of a blinkered tradition that sees no distinction worth examining between martyrdom and limitations on 
one’s ability to attack others. Yiannopoulos’s act is the political equivalent of an N.B.A. guard flopping 
in the hope of drawing a foul, a rendition of victimhood so aptly executed as to pass for the real thing.” 
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individual’s own views are internally consistent, whether individuals 
advance propositions that consistently align with their own political 
preferences, and whether their views about the First Amendment are 
either impossible to administer or impossible to square with necessary 
aspects of Constitutional interpretation or rule of law principles.  
Ultimately, of course, it may be impossible to avoid importing one’s 
own personal preferences about speech into one’s views about the 
doctrine.128  Given that reasonable minds can differ on the doctrine, 
perhaps some focus on the result is inevitable.  Primary focus on the 
result, however, renders the doctrine unprincipled and corrodes the rule 
of law by making result more significant than reasoning.  There may not 
be a baseline “true” First Amendment against which we can determine 
which interpretations are cynical, but we can create free speech doctrine 
that is as apolitical as possible. 
II. RESTORING FAITH IN A NONPARTISAN FREE SPEECH REGIME  
An important step in diminishing fears of, and actual instances of, First 
Amendment cynicism is to convince scholars, judges, and community 
members that the First Amendment can be, and mostly has been, 
nonpartisan and perhaps even apolitical. Individuals who believe there is 
a principled way to apply the First Amendment are more likely to choose 
this path over a cynical but politically advantageous interpretation of free 
speech doctrine.   
For the purposes of this article, “nonpartisan” means that the First 
Amendment can be used as a tool to protect viewpoints across the political 
spectrum.  Judges can and will invalidate speech restrictions as a violation 
of the First Amendment—and can and will uphold regulations as 
permissible under the First Amendment—regardless of whether political 
party affiliations and political ideology match the viewpoints expressed 
in the speech at issue.  In this way, the First Amendment is formally 
nonpartisan.   
For the purposes of this article, “apolitical” means that broad 
protections of First Amendment rights can lead to outcomes that do not 
necessarily benefit or serve a particular political ideology.  The 
distribution of speaking rights created by a formally nonpartisan First 
Amendment doctrine need not skew our political culture, direct legislative 
victories in a particular way, or favor outcomes of a particular political 
ideology.  In this way, the First Amendment is substantively apolitical.  A 
 
 128. Dan M. Kahan et al., ‘‘They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct 
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 884 (2012) (finding, in an empirical study, that people’s political 
commitments influenced whether they perceived a protest as consisting of protected speech or unprotected 
threatening conduct). 
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nonpartisan First Amendment protects speech that argues in favor of 
Democratic and Republican causes alike.  An apolitical First Amendment 
yields results beyond the speech itself that do not necessarily skew 
conservative—maintaining the current power structures or favoring 
certain types of conservative policies—over progressive.   
this Part contends that free speech doctrine can be, and has been, 
both nonpartisan and apolitical.  Section A details why the First 
Amendment cannot be progressive, but argues that this fact does not 
make strong free speech protections regressive or conservative.  
Section B defends the “free speech as liberty” approach as the best way 
to retain the nonpartisan and apolitical nature of the First Amendment, 
so long as the “free speech as equality” aspects are retained.       
A. A Nonpartisan, Apolitical First Amendment  
If we, as a society, want to move beyond simply reducing the 
perception of First Amendment cynicism and begin restoring broad 
support and respect for free speech principles, community members, 
judges, and scholars will have to be convinced that the principle of free 
speech is worth protecting.  Judges, scholars, and members of society may 
also have to be shown, if they do not believe in the inherent virtue of the 
principle of free speech, that the First Amendment does not serve their 
political opponents more than it serves their own causes.  For some, 
perhaps it is enough to demonstrate that free speech principles prevent the 
largest downside risk, or the worst, most tyrannical damage, to their 
causes,129 even if free speech serves their political opponents more than it 
serves them.  This method of convincing resembles John Rawls’s conceit 
that that individuals behind the “veil of ignorance” would choose to 
distribute social entitlements in a way that prevents the worst 
consequences to the least well off, even if this distribution does not 
maximize welfare for everyone.130   
Although the dominant strategy,131 in a game theoretical sense, may be 
to use the First Amendment cynically, widespread acceptance of a 
particular understanding of free speech principles may defeat this 
inclination.  The best way to convince the broadest swath of society in the 
continuing inherent and instrumental good of the First Amendment is to 
 
 129. According to Louis Michael Seidman, “free speech protects the political left from the most 
extreme threats.”  Seidman, supra note 12, at 2223.  However, this protection against extreme downside 
risks “does not make the speech right progressive.”  Id. 
 130. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 31, 92 (1971). 
 131. A “dominant strategy” is the best strategy for an actor to pursue no matter what strategies other 
actors in a given scenario choose.  See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11 
(1994). 
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demonstrate that free speech principles do not serve any given ideology.  
Despite the current peak of First Amendment criticism, free speech 
doctrine has been, and can continue to be, both nonpartisan and apolitical.    
Several progressive scholars have concluded that the First 
Amendment, as currently structured, cannot be politically progressive,   
defined by one scholar as “the modern political stance favoring an activist 
government that strives to achieve the public good, including the 
correction of unjust distributions produced by the market and the 
dismantling of power hierarchies based on traits like race, nationality, 
gender, class, and sexual orientation.”132  To create a First Amendment 
that would serve a progressive political ideology, according to two 
scholars, would require a “radical rethinking of existing doctrine,” and of 
the grammar of the First Amendment.133  The reasons for this are 
manifold.   
First, progressive ideology often requires government intervention. An 
active government exists in tension with the protection of free speech 
liberties, which generally require governmental nonfeasance into the 
private ordering of speech.134  In addition, this governmental 
nonintervention into the figurative “marketplace of ideas”135 means that 
those who have earned more money in the literal marketplace of 
commerce will be able to afford greater platforms for speech and will 
have more property on which to speak.  Because the First Amendment is 
not triggered by private suppression of speech, and because the 
government enforces state background laws unrelated to freedom of 
expression, those with the most property will have the greatest ability to 
create speech platforms and exclude others form this property.136  In this 
way, economic power translates to speaking power which translates to 
economic power, and the status quo is perpetuated.   
Further, not only does the First Amendment require nonfeasance into 
the marketplace of ideas, but it may prohibit governmental action in other 
 
 132. Seidman, supra note 12, at 2020. 
 133. Kessler & Pozen, supra note 12, at 2006.  
 134. Seidman, supra note 12, at 2240 (“Like the rest of the Constitution, First Amendment doctrine 
links freedom to government nonfeasance and oppression to government action. “). 
 135. A primary rationale underlying strong free speech protections is that an unregulated 
“marketplace of ideas” ultimately serves truth.  See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 2164 n.1.  Many scholars, 
however, have called into question the veracity of this notion.  See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 13, at 409 
(“My claim is that most [nonmundane] speech . . .  has little or no net positive epistemic value (that is, 
value for helping us discover the truth) . . . .”). 
 136. Goldberg, supra note 56, at 2185 (“Private citizens can thus refuse entry into their homes to 
anyone whose views, on any topic, from the best city for pizza to the most suitable presidential candidate, 
they disagree with. If the uninvited guest refuses to leave, the state can enforce property laws, even if they 
incidentally affect that speaker's message. Private employers can often fire individuals for speech they 
dislike, and social media platforms can remove users for speech they find hateful or otherwise 
objectionable.”). 
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spheres as well.  As noted earlier, from its early days of enforcement, the 
Supreme Court intertwined free speech rights and economic liberties.137  
The more robustly or aggressively courts enforce free speech rights, the 
more they may have to invalidate economic and social regulation.  The 
First Amendment cannot be fully “economically neutral,” and the view 
that it ever was is “illusory.”138   
Finally, and most basically, viewpoint neutrality means that courts 
cannot favor progressive viewpoints over conservative viewpoints.  
Combining this viewpoint neutrality with the current power structures 
means that some will be more affected, or more silenced, by particular 
types of speech than others.139   
For all of these reasons, those who seek governmental intervention to 
level the playing field caused by centuries of suppression on the basis of 
particular identity characteristics (such as race, gender, and sexual 
orientation) may be thwarted in their efforts by the First Amendment.          
In many ways, the fact that the First Amendment cannot be progressive 
is a good thing and it is evidence of a nonpartisan and perhaps apolitical 
First Amendment.  Just because the First Amendment cannot primarily 
serve progressive ideology does not necessarily mean the First 
Amendment has to be regressive or conservative.  Certainly, there are 
ways in which free speech doctrine perpetuates the status quo, and gives 
those with economic or social advantages more free speech protections, 
with which they can further entrench their privileges and power.  But 
protecting those disfavored by the political branches against 
governmental censorship means that minority rights and the rights of 
those at the vanguard, or outside, of any given social hierarchy will be 
protected, whether they are advocating for progressive causes or not.140  
Although the state action doctrine does benefit those with greater 
resources and power, and although corporations receive greater speech 
rights now than in the past, the current conceptualization and application 
of free speech rights both protects progressive speech and leads to 
progressive political outcomes.  In addition, much economic regulation 
 
 137. See supra Section I.C. 
 138. Kessler, supra note 18, at 2001. 
 139. Many feminists argue, for example, that pornography subordinates and objectifies women, 
leading to their silencing—either because they choose not to speak or because others do not take the 
content of their messages as seriously. For a summary of these arguments, see Goldberg, supra note 56, 
at 2180 & accompanying notes. 
 140. These rights will be protected as against governmental suppression but will not be protected 
as against private citizens deterring or disincentivizing others from speaking. Many progressive scholars 
do not believe the greatest threat to free speech comes from the government. See Wu, supra note 13, at 
548–49 (arguing that the greatest threat to our free speech environment is no longer government 
suppression, but the attention of listeners and private parties’ disruption of the channels of 
communication). However, the problem of vying for the attention of listeners is a feature, not a bug, of 
the ideal marketplace of ideas, and the Internet has democratized free speech far beyond traditional media.   
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can still be upheld, even under a robust interpretation of what constitutes 
protected speech.  There are ways to cabin the expanding commercial 
speech doctrine to balance interests; these doctrinal possibilities are 
explored in Part III.   
Most fundamentally, sacrificing progressivism to a free speech 
doctrine that protects viewpoints antithetical to progressive ideology 
means that courts will also protect viewpoints that promote progressive 
ideology.  In this way, free speech doctrine is nonpartisan.  Formally, no 
side wins.141  The deregulation of the marketplace of ideas often benefits 
progressive speech, such as labor picketing and civil rights marches.142  
Our First Amendment jurisprudence on academic freedom, as another 
example, primarily benefits academics with left-leaning views and 
historically protected professors with suspected associations with the 
Communist Party.143   
Courts have protected speech of radical and subversive or 
counterculture thinkers and actors throughout the First Amendment’s 
history,144 and that trend continues today.145   Although imperfect, courts 
can and do have a grand history of protecting speech regardless of 
viewpoint.   
By requiring governmental acceptance of the speech of the 
disempowered, the First Amendment can be not only nonpartisan, but 
apolitical, leading to substantive outcomes that favor progressives as 
much as conservatives.  Despite many progressive scholars’ calls for 
increased regulation of the Internet,146 to the extent that progressivism 
favors marginalized communities over elites, the increased 
democratization of free speech, through media like the Internet, has 
 
 141. Of course, formal equality, while nonpartisan, may not lead to ideologically neutral results, or 
even the optimal access to the marketplace of ideas. See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an 
Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2156 (2018) (“But to say that courts 
could, and should, interpret the First Amendment's command in a manner that is less constrained by the 
requirement of formal equality . . . is to say that courts could, and should, engage in a far more realistic 
analysis than they currently do of the political, economic, and social realities that impede, or enable, the 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate that the First Amendment is supposed to make 
possible--and develop rules in response.”).  However, the First Amendment can also be substantively 
apolitical. See infra pp. 35–37. 
 142. Seidman, supra note 12, at 2222. 
 143. See Neil H. Hutchins et al., Faculty, the Courts, and the First Amendment, 120 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1027, 1032 (2016) (“Academic freedom became viewed as possessing a constitutional dimension 
during the Cold War era, when McCarthyism inspired government officials to inject themselves in public 
education for the purpose of identifying and expelling communist sympathizers.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (protecting the academic freedom 
rights of university professor suspected of having ties to Communism).  
 145. In Matal v. Tam, for example, the Court recently held that the Patent and Trademark Office 
cannot deny a trademark to an Asian-American band seeking to reclaim Asian-American stereotypes and 
slurs by naming themselves “The Slants.”  137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) 
 146. See Wu, supra note 13, at 572–73. 
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served progressivism as well, even if companies like Facebook have First 
Amendment rights to create their own speech architecture.147  When 
marginalized, countercultural voices are given counter-majoritarian free 
speech rights, they can use these rights to change the way disempowered 
communities are seen and heard, and how the law responds to these 
communities.  Recent examples include the #MeToo movement, which 
highlights sexual assault and harassment, and the popularity of memes 
sharing anti-racist information.148  The #MeToo movement is not only a 
social and cultural phenomenon; it may lead to changes in the ways the 
law protects victims of harassment, who are usually women, and how 
judges sentence those convicted of rape and sexual assault.149   
Reshaping the First Amendment in order to better serve progressive 
goals is a fool’s errand because it will so disrupt First Amendment law 
that it will not even be useful to progressives.  Progressive scholars who 
recognize this believe that power should be reclaimed through the 
democracy, not necessarily though the courts; Professor Seidman further 
believes that the First Amendment should be demystified as a necessary 
and inevitable tool for social good.150  However, the public would not be 
served by diminished respect for the First Amendment.  One intriguing 
reason Seidman cites as supporting First Amendment 
“demystification”151—that free speech as a right is dogmatic and 
“dictatorial”152—ultimately does not make much sense.  According to 
Seidman, the existence of the First Amendment in the Constitution means 
that the issue of free speech is, ironically, not truly up for debate.153   
The error of this argument is that although a constitutional right creates 
difficulty for change, the First Amendment is the reason we can debate 
whether free speech is a virtue.  Because of our First Amendment 
protections, we are free to debate the worthiness of the First Amendment.  
 
 147. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 2189–90. 
 148. See Monica Anderson & Skye Toor, How Social Media Users Have Discussed Sexual 
Harassment Since #MeToo Went Viral, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/11/how-social-media-users-have-discussed-sexual-
harassment-since-metoo-went-viral/. 
 149. See, e.g., Charisse Jones, #MeToo One Year Later: Cosby, Moonves Fall, Sex Harassment 
Fight at Work Far From Over, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2018 12:11 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/04/metoo-workplace-sexual-harassment-laws-policies-
progress/1378191002/. 
 150. According to Seidman, “[i]f the Constitution is not, and cannot be, a fair and neutral framework 
that everyone is bound to accept, that is a reason to oppose constitutional obligation. If progressives are 
harmed by First Amendment mystification, they should favor demystifying the Amendment rather than 
embracing it.”  Seidman, supra note 12, at 2245. 
 151. Id. (“If progressives are harmed by First Amendment mystification, they should favor 
demystifying the Amendment rather than embracing it.”). 
 152. Id. at 2247. 
 153. Id. (“If the Constitution requires something, then that is the end of the argument, at least in 
American constitutional culture.”). 
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Instead of feeling beholden to the current First Amendment, some have 
even proposed amendments to the Constitution to limit the First 
Amendment, in light of cases like Citizens United.154  As long as 
viewpoint neutrality persists in free speech doctrine, we are free to 
consider the extent of our free speech protections and determine whether 
we are satisfied that they are being applied in a nonpartisan, apolitical 
way.  
Indeed, even cases that appear to favor substantively conservative 
outcomes eventually aid progressive causes and vice versa.  Thus, cases 
that seemingly favor one side of the political aisle end up benefitting the 
other side.  For example, the decision in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, which held that a private parade 
can exclude the float of an organization comprised of gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual Irish Americans,155 ultimately supports the Charlotte Pride 
Parade’s right to exclude the conservative group Gays for Trump.156  The 
courts’ general antipathy towards censorship of student speech often 
protects conservative speech,157 but also shields students from 
punishment for wearing bracelets declaring “I Heart Boobies” that 
promote breast cancer awareness.158  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,159 the anti-authoritarian 
decision that permitted public school students to refuse to stand and salute 
the flag,160 was marshalled in Janus to allow a conservative child support 
specialist to refuse to contribute to his public sector union.161  
 
 154. Press Release, Rep. Jamie Raskin, House of Representatives, Bipartisan Constitutional 
Amendment to Overturn Citizens United Introduced  (Jan. 4, 2019), https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-
releases/bipartisan-constitutional-amendment-overturn-citizens-united-introduced. 
 155. 515 U.S. 557, 559–61 (1995). 
 156. Eugene Volokh, Can the Charlotte Pride Parade Exclude Gays for Trump Float?, 
WASH. POST: BLOG (June 8, 2017, 6:52 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/06/08/can-charlotte-pride-parade-exclude-gays-for-trump-
float/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.86b39f960176.  
 157. See, e.g., Blair v. Shippensburg University, 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 365 (2003) (finding university 
speech code and harassment policy overbroad after plaintiffs claimed that a reluctance “to advance certain 
controversial theories or ideas regarding any number of political or social issues because ... she feared that 
discussion of such theories might be sanctionable under applicable University [S]peech [C]ode[ ]”). 
 158. See B.H. v. Easton Area School District, 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 159. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 160. Id. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
 161. See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463, 2464, 2478 (2018) (citing West Virginia Bd. of 
Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).  Justice Kagan’s dissent takes issue with the majority’s use of 
Barnette to justify the view that compelling speech works a greater injury than suppressing speech because 
Barnette is an “exceptional” case.  Id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority posits that compelling 
speech always works a greater injury, and so always requires a greater justification. But the only case the 
majority cites for that reading of our precedent is possibly (thankfully) the most exceptional in our First 
Amendment annals: It involved the state forcing children to swear an oath contrary to their religious 
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Of course, courts may not always apply the First Amendment 
consistently, independent of viewpoint, which leads to perhaps legitimate 
accusations of First Amendment cynicism.  In Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project,162 one of the few cases to hold that a speech restriction 
survived strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting 
“material support” to terrorist organizations, even when this material 
support came in the form of speech advising the organizations on how to 
more peacefully accomplish their goals.163  Perhaps the Justices allowed 
their antipathy towards terrorism to color their analysis.   
Judges are human beings.  Some threats may be considered too great 
to ignore, or judges’ political inclinations may get the better of them.  
Perfect political neutrality is aspirational and asymptotic, but the constant 
striving betters our jurisprudence.  Even just in the last decade, the 
Supreme Court has decided many First Amendment cases involving 
controversial speech in a nonpartisan way with wide margins in favor of 
First Amendment rights.164  Some have charged the Roberts Court with 
favoring only certain types of speech, as Justice Roberts has authored 
opinions deferring to the government in public school and prison cases, 
yet expanding speech rights for corporations.165  However, as mentioned 
earlier, expanding speech rights for corporations is justifiable to the extent 
the Court does not wish to discriminate on the basis of speaker identity or 
wishes to use corporations as proxies for listeners’ rights—although 
limiting principles to the expansion of corporate rights should be 
incorporated into the doctrine and will be discussed later in Part III.  And 
the fact that the government sometimes wins in free speech cases does not 
necessarily reflect First Amendment cynicism since there are nonpartisan, 
institutional reasons to be especially deferential to the government for 
 
beliefs.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 162. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 163. Id. at 30 (holding that Congress was justified in finding that even when material support 
consists of imparting legitimate knowledge, this support can further the violent goals of a terrorist 
organization, especially if “support frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to 
violent ends.). 
 164. See, e.g. Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018) (invalidating state law 
banning political apparel at polling places as impermissibly vague); Lozman v. City of Rivera Beach, 138 
S. Ct. 1935, 1954–55 (holding that probable cause to arrest someone who disrupted city council meeting 
does not bar First Amendment retaliation claim); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (invalidating provision 
of federal law denying trademarks to marks that disparage groups of people); Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (invalidating state law denying sex offenders access to certain social 
media websites); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459-60 (2011) (invalidating damages for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against controversial religious group protesting at military funerals); 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (invalidating statute criminalizing depictions of animal 
torture). 
 165. See, e.g., David H. Gans, Roberts at 10: The Strongest Free Speech Court in History?, 
Constitutional Accountability Center, https://www.theusconstitution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Roberts_at_10_09_First_Amendment_Snapshot_0.pdf. 
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speech in public lower schools and prisons.     
The best way to generally preserve and continue to facilitate an 
apolitical First Amendment is to conceive of free speech as liberty, but 
also to remember that free speech as equality serves important goals.  
Where both of these approaches can be served, faith in the First 
Amendment can be at its highest.     
B. The “Neutrality” of a Libertarian First Amendment  
Because free speech doctrine, by and large, can be both nonpartisan 
and apolitical, dramatic changes in the doctrine are not necessary to 
preserve its nonpartisan, apolitical nature.  The First Amendment cannot 
be reshaped to be more progressive without compromising both 
progressivism and the most essential,  nonpartisan, and  apolitical aspects 
of the doctrine.  Restoration of belief in a bipartisan First Amendment 
therefore requires acceptance of civil libertarian tradition, with its strong 
state action doctrine and viewpoint neutrality, with some limiting 
principles.  This section analyzes why “free speech as liberty,” with its 
emphasis on viewpoint neutrality and governmental nonfeasance, must 
remain the default paradigm for First Amendment doctrine.   There are 
contexts, however, where “free speech as equality,” which guarantees 
resources for marginal or underrepresented speakers, best serves a 
nonpartisan, apolitical First Amendment.166   
As explored in the previous section, the currently dominant free speech 
as liberty approach does not necessarily have to lead to libertarian 
political outcomes.  This means that even though First Amendment 
jurisprudence has a libertarian valence, it can still be apolitical.167  
Further, free speech as liberty does not favor speech expressing libertarian 
ideas, meaning it can be nonpartisan.  Although one could argue that, at a 
high level of abstraction, the choice of “free speech as liberty” is itself 
political, these arguments would render any interpretive method 
unavoidably political.  The act of interpreting law instead of flipping a 
coin could also be considered political, at an even higher level of 
abstraction.  For our purposes, what is important is that “free speech as 
liberty” will treat fairly speech across the political spectrum and that all 
ideologies can benefit from this approach.  
To preserve the nonpartisan, apolitical aspects of the First Amendment, 
the free speech as liberty model is the best starting point.  Because, in that 
model, all efforts to “skew the private ordering of speech” are treated with 
 
 166. These terms and their basic approaches come from Kathleen Sullivan’s Two Concepts of 
Freedom of Speech.  See supra Section I.C.1. 
 167. See supra Section II.A. (arguing that our free speech doctrine has been, and can continue to 
be, generally nonpartisan and apolitical). 
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skepticism,168 free speech as liberty best preserves the viewpoint 
neutrality and governmental nonfeasance critical to a nonpartisan and 
apolitical First Amendment.  The dominant free speech as liberty regime 
simply means the Supreme Court takes a generally libertarian approach 
to free speech doctrine.  As noted in the previous section, the doctrine 
cannot, on a large scale, re-distribute power or cater to the most 
vulnerable in ways ideal for progressives.  This is a feature, not a bug, of 
a nonpartisan First Amendment, but it means judges need to be vigilant 
to ensure that the First Amendment is also not predominantly 
conservative or regressive. 
Accepting the generally civil libertarian orientation of free speech 
doctrine does not mean the free speech as equality model, which provides 
special solicitude to the speech of the minority or the “little guy,”169 does 
not have an important place in the jurisprudence.  There are contexts in 
which the free speech as equality model is consistent with a nonpartisan 
First Amendment and can foster progressive ideals—to balance out the 
ways in which a nonpartisan First Amendment yields conservative or 
libertarian results.  However, because free speech as equality “endorses a 
kind of affirmative action for marginal speech,”170 its approach should 
prevail only in cases where free speech as equality makes governmental 
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint less likely.  Cases of this nature, 
where the free speech equality model serves a nonpartisan First 
Amendment, generally occur where the government has already 
intervened, such as cases involving government subsidies, or in cases 
where the government must intervene because nonintervention would 
give the government too much discretion to discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint, such as heckler’s veto cases.   
As examples, the government must generally allow access for speech 
on public land classified as a public forum.171 This access provides 
speakers with fewer resources advantages in the marketplace of ideas that 
they would not otherwise have had.172  The designation of land as a public 
forum benefits speech across the political spectrum, but on the whole 
favors those with less money and power, thus creating substantive 
 
 168. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 145. 
 169. Id. at 145–46. 
 170. Id. at 145. 
 171. See id. 
 172. In a traditional or a designated public forum, content-based restrictions on speech must survive 
strict scrutiny, and even content neutral restrictions must allow sufficient access to the forum.  See Perry 
Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For the state to enforce a content-
based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that 
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.  The state may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and 
manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”) (citations omitted).  
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equality in a way that aligns with progressive ideology. This restriction 
on government censorship on public land bolsters the apolitical aspects of 
the First Amendment by undercutting some of the conservative results 
inherent in nonpartisan free speech doctrine.   
The free speech as equality model works well for traditional and 
designated public fora because the government is already involved in land 
ownership and governmental nonfeasance is impossible, so requiring 
equal access ensures that the government does not have the discretion to 
discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint.  Of course, the 
government may place conditions on speech when it explicitly funds 
certain activities,173 even if it may not deny government benefits on the 
basis of viewpoint, and has much more discretion to restrict speech in 
nonpublic fora, such as schools and prisons.174  Courts must continue to 
distinguish public from nonpublic fora, and to distinguish government 
funding activities from participation in government programs/access to 
government benefits,175 in a way that makes free speech doctrine less 
political.  Student activities fees at public universities, for example, must 
be administered in a viewpoint neutral fashion,176 providing resources to 
groups that might not be able to procure their own funding. 
Another example of the free speech as equality model best serving an 
apolitical, nonpartisan First Amendment is the doctrine’s approach to 
instances where controversial speakers elicit violent or destructive 
reactions from listeners.  In those cases, the government may not pass 
security or cleanup costs off to speakers in the form of increased costs for 
speaking permits.177  This rule, which may be described as providing 
benefits to controversial speech, embraces an anti-“heckler’s veto” 
principle: the government must not punish speakers for the violent 
reactions of listeners, thus preventing hecklers from serving as censors.178  
 
 173. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding that the government may prohibit 
recipients of public family planning funds to engage in abortion counseling because “[t]he Government 
can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it 
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks 
to deal with the problem in another way”).  
 174. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 159–60 (discussing how free speech rights do not extend to places 
like airports and schools and how the government may limit the rights of public employees). 
 175. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1761 (2017) (distinguishing the trademark regime, where 
the government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint from direct, monetary government funding 
of certain activities). 
 176. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 177. Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); see also Erica Goldberg, 
Must Universities Subsidize Controversial Ideas: Allocating Security Fees When Student Groups Host 
Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 349 (2011) (applying Forsyth to public universities 
charging student groups for hosting outside speakers and arguing security fees must be imposed in a 
content neutral way). 
 178. Goldberg, supra note 177, at 358–59 (discussing heckler’s veto jurisprudence and 
scholarship). 
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Here, free speech as equality protects the speech of those on the 
margins of society, especially those without vast resources, and ensures 
nondiscrimination by the government.  One reason for the heckler’s veto 
principle is that the government cannot be given too much discretion to 
determine what price to charge for speech (in the form of speaking 
permits) because variations in cost may conceal governmental decisions 
to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.179  When the government grants 
permits to speakers wishing to host parades or rallies, it cannot give itself 
such broad latitude that it can hide discrimination on the basis of 
viewpoint.180    
Indeed, the government generally has an affirmative duty to protect 
speakers instead of arresting them181 – and thus state actors do not have 
the leeway to alter how much security they provide to speakers based on 
whether or not state actors (e.g., the police) deem the speech acceptable 
or objectionable.  In this way, state actors, if they already provide police 
assistance to prevent violence generally (which every state does), must do 
so to protect controversial speakers, regardless of ability to pay. This 
approach preserves viewpoint neutrality by prohibiting the state from 
determining which speech it prefers when providing security services.  
In cases where the government must necessarily intervene, free speech 
as equality ensures that the government does not discriminate on the basis 
of viewpoint when it provides services, grants subsidies, or otherwise has 
the ability to exercise potentially pretextual discretion.  Limited to these 
contexts, where the government already is intervening in some way—
either on its own land, in providing subsidies or issuing permits, or in 
providing background security generally, free speech as equality serves a 
nonpartisan First Amendment well.  Outside of these contexts, however, 
free speech as equality has the potential to undermine the nonpartisan 
viewpoint neutrality of free speech doctrine. 
When free speech as liberty and free speech as equality are in conflict 
with each other, the most apolitical solution is to favor the free speech as 
liberty model.  Deferring too much to the free speech as equality model 
requires governmental determinations as to who is worthy of special 
 
 179. Id. at 354–56 (discussing Forsyth’s disapproval of licensing schemes that provide too much 
discretion to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint or that facially discriminate based on listener reaction). 
 180. Forsyth, 505 U.S. 123 at 130 (holding that a permit licensing scheme in a public forum “may 
not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official” and that “any permit scheme 
controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the message).  
Charging extra fees for speech where the government expects listeners to have violent reactions 
impermissibly discriminated against speech on the basis of its message.  Id. at 135–36. 
 181. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for 
speech that disturbed the peace because police should have handled the hostile crowd instead of silencing 
the speaker.  Id. at 544-45, 550.  However, if the police cannot stave off an angry crowd, they may interfere 
with the speech of a lawful speaker.  See Brian A. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment 
Rights of Students in the Public Schools, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 12 n.64 (1984). 
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governmental solicitude, thus compromising viewpoint neutrality.  Courts 
should be careful not to extend jurisprudence on the heckler’s veto into 
spheres where the government has not acted—and need not act—in order 
to reduce governmental discretion and solicitude that may foster 
viewpoint discrimination.  In those spaces, requiring governmental action 
to serve the free speech as equality model would give the government too 
much discretion to judge speech based on its underlying viewpoint.   
For this reason, we should be wary of extending principles relating to 
the heckler’s veto, as Professor Tim Wu proposes, to combating 
everything from fraud to harassment on the Internet.182  According to 
Professor Wu, “[t]he police officer whose duty it is to protect speakers 
from harassment and attack needs to turn his or her efforts to protecting 
online speech.”183  Extending heckler’s veto principles beyond protecting 
speakers from violent or disruptive conduct into protecting speakers from 
objectionable and potentially unprotected speech by others on the Internet 
cannot be accomplished, however, without making judgments about the 
content of the heckler’s speech, whereas the government’s duty to protect 
controversial speakers from imminent violence does not require judgment 
calls about the nature of the speech at issue.  Instead of extending free 
speech as equality principles into domains where they may facilitate 
viewpoint discrimination, courts should simply apply the current 
doctrines balancing tort principles and free speech rights to the Internet, 
with the usual high standards for determining when speech becomes 
unprotected harassment, threats, libel, or fraud.184 The free speech as 
liberty model generally works best for online speech because it is not a 
governmental forum, and the government’s intervention is not a pre-
requisite to the speech or necessary to prevent imminent violence.   
The Court can massage the doctrine, however, to facilitate the reality 
and the perception that everyone benefits from free speech doctrine, not 
just the rich or the corporations. 
III. DE-POLITICIZING THE DOCTRINE AND ENSURING FAIR PROTECTION 
There are ways that the Supreme Court can reduce the perception that 
the First Amendment is currently a tool of conservative policies, or that 
liberals have abandoned free speech in an unprincipled way.  One way is 
to more closely control the docket of free speech cases.  Another way is 
to place limiting principles into the current doctrine to ensure that those 
 
 182. See Wu, supra note 13, at 572.  
 183. Id. 
 184. See Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 824, 865–66 (2015) (exploring 
why certain categories of speech, such as libel, harassment, and obscenity, are unprotected and discussing 
the doctrines that create the exceptions from protection). 
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who most need the First Amendment can receive its benefits. 
This Part first discusses how the Court should arrange its First 
Amendment docket to best guard against accusations of First 
Amendment cynicism.  Next, this Part discusses ways to approach the 
doctrine to move it closer to its aspirational goals of being apolitical 
and nonpartisan, especially in the areas of corporate speech, the 
intersection of free speech and economic restrictions, and hate speech.     
A.  Managing the Docket 
The Court should be mindful of the cases it selects for its docket.  Chief 
Justice Roberts cares greatly about the Supreme Court’s legitimacy,185 
especially about the public’s perception of the Court as legitimate.186  In 
the current climate of First Amendment skepticism, the Court would be 
better served taking cases where the free speech as liberty and free speech 
and equality models overlap.  Cases where free speech as liberty and free 
speech as equality overlap will generally involve a politically unpopular, 
marginalized, or somehow vulnerable actor, especially one who does not 
belong to a group that traditionally wields power or privilege, being 
denied—by the government—certain speech rights or access to particular 
speech media.   
An excellent recent example of where the interests underlying free 
speech as liberty and free speech as equality intersect is Packingham v. 
North Carolina.187  In that case, convicted sex offenders who completed 
their sentences, like Lester Packingham, were prohibited from accessing 
social media sites that had particular functions, such as the ability to 
directly message people.188  Convicted sex offers in North Carolina, 
therefore, could not use websites such as Washingtonpost.com or 
Facebook.189  Indeed, Mr. Packingham was convicted under this law for 
creating a Facebook post about a good experience getting a traffic ticket 
dismissed.190  The Court unanimously overturned this conviction, with 
 
 185. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, ObamaCare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. REV. 763, 
767 & n.22 (2013) (“Roberts has stressed throughout his chief justiceship that building large coalitions is 
key to the Court's legitimacy and his own measure of success.”). 
 186. Some see Chief Justice Roberts as desiring to preserve the Court’s power, which is distinct but 
related to the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy.  See Benjamin Softness, Preserving Judicial 
Supremacy Come Heller High Water, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 623 627 n. 24 (2013) (citing sources for the 
proposition that the Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), the cases involving 
a constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act, “was a masterclass in power preservation”). 
 187. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
 188. North Carolina made it a criminal offense for registered sex offenders “to access a commercial 
social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become 
members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.”  Id. at 1733. 
 189. Id. at 1736-37. 
 190. Id. at 1734. 
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five Justices signing onto the majority opinion, three Justices concurring 
in the result, and one Justice taking no part in the opinion.  Central to the 
Court’s ruling was the view that “to foreclose access to social media 
altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise 
of First Amendment rights.”191  
Packingham fits nicely into the free speech as liberty model because 
the government had deprived Mr. Packingham of the ability to engage in 
speech online, blocking access to the marketplace of ideas for those it 
deemed too dangerous.  The case also fits nicely into the free speech as 
equality model because convicted sex offenders are a maligned and 
stigmatized population, and often the government isolates and punishes 
this group in ways that become oppressive.  Convicted felons are also a 
generally vulnerable and less powerful population.  Because the state 
cannot police and prevent sex offenses by simply prohibiting access to 
certain speech private forums, like Facebook, the government will have 
to spend more money policing sex crimes in other ways.  In this way, Mr. 
Packingham’s speech, or access to social media, can be viewed as both 
impermissibly penalized (free speech as liberty) but also requiring 
subsidization (free speech as equality) by the government.  The 
government, not he, will incur the increased costs, in the wake of 
Packingham v. North Carolina, of prosecuting recidivist sex offenders.  
This subsidization is not diluting the ability of others from speaking in 
order to give Mr. Packingham greater speech rights, but simply works as 
a way to prevent the government from using its power to affect the private 
marketplace of ideas.  A case like Packingham is exactly the kind of case, 
unlike, say, Citizens United,192 where using the free speech as equality 
approach would lead to less viewpoint discrimination, not more. 
Granting certiorari in cases like Packingham, which will garner large 
victories for free speech and will allow the public to see that First 
Amendment doctrine need not be political, or politically polarizing.  
Then, when cases like Janus are decided, there is more of a buffer 
preventing the public from losing faith precipitously in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
Of course, this type of docket-managing will succeed only if the 
Justices wish to de-politicize both actual First Amendment doctrine and 
the public’s perception of free speech jurisprudence.  Some have accused 
Justices of purposely selecting cases to lay the groundwork for results 
 
 191. Id. at 1737. 
 192. In Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the majority rejected prior cases’ application of the 
antidistortion principle, where the speech of the more powerful can be silenced in order to allow other 
speech to have increased influence.  See id. at 349 (“If the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, 
however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association 
that has taken on the corporate form.”). 
40
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/1
2020] FIRST AMENDMENT CYNICISM AND REDEMPTION 999 
they like politically.  For example, Justice Kagan noted, in Janus, that 
some Justices “were working overtime,”193 trying to cast doubt upon 
Abood without overruling it, in a  “6–year crusade to ban agency fees.”194  
Her view seems to be that some Justices were inserting language into 
cases, or perhaps selecting cases strategically, to, over time, erode the 
underpinnings of Abood before it could be explicitly overruled.  Many 
have also criticized Justice Alito for purposely attempting to find cases 
like Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, where 
a Christian baker asserted a First Amendment right to refuse to create a 
custom-made wedding cake for a same-sex wedding, so that he can 
advance a particular partisan agenda.195 
If Justice Alito has a particular view of free speech, and that informs 
how he selects cases, critics who simply disagree with the outcomes he 
reaches do not have a true, principled objection to either his selection of 
cases or his jurisprudence.  However, if Justice Alito is choosing free 
speech cases that allow him to reach results he prefers—in a way that is 
unrelated to his views about the First Amendment—he is contributing to 
First Amendment cynicism and justifying allegations of First Amendment 
cynicism.   
If so, scrutinizing his docket-managing is justified.  Justices seeking to 
politicize the First Amendment should be called to account for their First 
Amendment cynicism, and we should develop a constitutional culture 
where Justices are encouraged to fully articulate their broader theories of 
jurisprudence and how their opinions do not consistently accord with their 
political views.  However, the best way to do this may not be through 
easily and glibly quoted (and misquoted) language in a Supreme Court 
opinion.  Rather, rigorous, academic, open-minded scholarship should be 
devoted to gauging whether Janus is justified, and whether Justice Alito 
is consistent in his view of free speech.  And even if Justice Alito is 
unprincipled, which he may be, Janus was signed onto by four other 
Justices, including former Justice Kennedy, who has an expansive view 
of free speech rights that easily accords with the outcome the majority 
reached in Janus.  Allegations of free speech cynicism should not be made 
lightly, as they create a vicious cycle, perhaps one we are currently 
experiencing.   
 
 193. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 194. Id. at 2500. 
 195. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).  The Court ultimately decided the case based on the baker’s religious 
liberty, postponing the question of whether custom-designed cakes are speech that cannot be compelled 
by anti-discrimination laws for another day. See id. at 1732. 
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B. Corporate Speech and Economic Regulations 
Although unpopular among progressives, our current approach to the 
speech rights of corporations, especially as exemplified by cases like 
Citizens United, does fit well within the free speech as liberty vision of 
the First Amendment.196  However, there are ways the Court can mitigate 
the politically skewing effects of broad free speech rights for corporate 
actors.  For example, the Court can partially disentangle free speech rights 
from economic liberties by limiting the exceptions created from generally 
applicable economic restrictions for speakers such as the media and 
religious individuals.  The Court should further clarify that in the 
commercial speech context, compelled speech is not as constitutionally 
problematic as suppression of speech. 
First, many of the seminal cases that bound up economic liberties with 
free speech rights involved exceptions to generally applicable laws for the 
media or religious pamphleteers.197  The Supreme Court can hold, without 
overruling many of these cases, that exceptions from generally applicable 
economic regulations that make speech more expensive, but do not 
compel speech or necessarily prohibit speech, will be granted only if the 
economic regulation (such as a tax) will severely restrict the speaker’s 
ability to speak.  The Jehovah’s witness peddling-tax cases would have to 
be overruled, to the extent that the witnesses had not alleged that the 
peddling taxes “were so excessive as to be prohibitory,” although these 
cases perhaps could be sustained statutorily by the principle that selling 
religious literature may not be a commercial enterprise, and thus may not 
fall within the legislature’s licensing or tax provisions.198   
Of course, the government cannot specifically target religious 
pamphleteers or newspapers,199 but it can include them in generally 
applicable economic restrictions—including restrictions that affect the 
profits received from advertising200—unless those restrictions would 
severely curtail an individual or corporation’s speech activities.  By 
making a few doctrinal changes, which cohere with the rest of First 
Amendment jurisprudence,201 the Court can begin to disentangle speech 
 
 196. See infra Section II.A. 
 197. See supra Section I.C.2. 
 198. See Murdock v. PA, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (“But the mere fact that the religious literature 
is ‘sold’ by itinerant preachers rather than ‘donated’ does not transform evangelism into a commercial 
enterprise.”). 
 199. Thus, a tax on newspapers of a certain circulation, as in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 
U.S. 233 (1936), will still be unconstitutional, as a targeting on certain types of newspapers. 
 200. Thus, the Court could repudiate the dicta in Grosjean that anything that has a tendency to affect 
advertising revenue is a prior restraint on speech.  See Kessler, supra note 12, at 1966–67. 
 201. Religious speech is generally not treated with special solicitude under the First Amendment.  
According to a compelling view, the First Amendment deprives the government of the power to restrict 
all speech, and thus does not grant special deference to any particular brand of speech.  See Jay S. Bybee, 
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rights from economic regulations. 
In addition, the Court can and should more explicitly note that in the 
commercial speech context, compelled speech does not work as great a 
First Amendment harm as the suppression of speech.  As Amanda Shanor 
noted, “while the Supreme Court recently affirmed the asymmetry of 
constitutional protection that applies to regulations that compel rather 
than restrict commercial speech in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. 
United States,202 some circuit court decisions have not been so clear.”203  
In Milavetz, the Court cited prior decisions for the proposition that 
“[u]njustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements offend the 
First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but ‘an advertiser's rights 
are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are 
reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of 
consumers.’”204    
By reaffirming with no ambiguity that disclosure requirements related 
to preventing deception in the commercial context are generally not 
constitutionally problematic, the Court could mitigate the worry that, in 
an era of soft paternalism where regulations take the form of mandatory 
disclosure instead of outright prohibition, free speech will not undo the 
administrative state.205  Compelled speech is not as problematic as 
suppression of speech with respect to corporations engaging in purely 
commercial speech because the primary reasons the First Amendment 
prohibits compelled speech are inapplicable.  In Janus, for example, the 
Court held that compelled speech is equally corrosive as suppression of 
speech, but the Court’s rationale was applicable only in cases where an 
individual, such as Mark Janus is speaking, not a corporation.  In Janus, 
the reason compelled speech was considered even more harmful than the 
suppression of speech is because compelled speech forces individuals to 
disobey and explicitly disavow their consciences.  Corporate disclosures 
involving purely commercial (not political) speech do not suffer from this 
problem because a corporation is not an individual, and thus does not have 
the same autonomy rights.  Courts should therefore hold that requiring 
certain types of disclosures for corporations are permissible.   
This distinction between suppression of speech and compulsion of 
speech in the commercial speech context would not compromise the 
 
Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. 
L. REV. 251, 313–16 (2000) (“[T]he First Amendment is an immunity of general applicability, which 
means that when the government has violated anyone's First Amendment rights, the law (as applied to 
everyone) is unconstitutional.”). 
 202. 559 U.S. 229 (2010). 
 203. Shanor, supra note 18, at 152.   
 204. Milavetz, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
 205. See supra Section I.A. 
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rationales behind Citizens United.  The federal law overturned in Citizens 
United, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, involved suppression of 
core, political speech: a documentary about Hillary Clinton made by a 
nonprofit corporation.  By prohibiting corporations to spend money on 
documentaries like the one at issue in Citizens United, the Court was 
suppressing speech and discriminating on speech based on speaker 
identity, skewing the marketplace of ideas for all listeners.  However, in 
cases of mandatory disclosures for corporations, especially those that are 
related to preventing deception, there should be less protection for 
compelled speech because the corporation is not being asked to betray 
individual convictions, so the rationale behind compelled speech—not 
wanting to force individuals to declare something antithetical to their 
private consciences—is not relevant.   
This logic also explains why controversial corporate disclosures that 
are an attempt to affect the marketplace of ideas, especially if the content 
compelled undermines the views of the corporation, should be 
unconstitutional.  Preserving the distinction between compelled speech 
and suppression of speech for commercial, nonpolitical, corporate speech 
does not mean that all compelled corporate disclosures will be 
constitutionally permissible.  Forcing a private utility company to include 
in its billing statements opinions of third parties that contradict content 
expressed in the utility’s newsletter was deemed unconstitutional.206  The 
state’s interest must still be in informing consumers about attributes of the 
specific product in a way that either prevents deception or provides facts 
about something consumers have expressed an interest in knowing.207  In 
general, greater scrutiny should be given to disclosure requirements that 
go beyond preventing deception, as these may be intended to affect 
consumer preferences as opposed to simply inform consumers about the 
attributes of a product.  Further, when the speech becomes controversial 
or not “purely factual,”208 or is designed to influence the marketplace of 
ideas instead of the actual marketplace, then the compelled disclosure 
should not pass the Central Hudson test for commercial speech.209   
Recently, the Supreme Court invalidated disclosure requirements on 
 
 206. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 4, 11 (1986). 
 207. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a permissible government 
interest need not be solely in preventing deception to consumers, but did not articulate exactly what type 
of interests are sufficient.  See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(allowing “substantial” interests to justify compelled corporate disclosure, although noting that the term 
substantial “seems elusive”). 
 208. Id. at 27.  In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, the Supreme 
Court held that purely factual and uncontroversial disclosure requirements that relate to commercial 
transactions will be upheld unless they are “unjustified and unduly burdensome.” 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985).  
 209. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 26 (applying Central Hudson to “country of origin” labeling for 
meat and finding the mandatory disclosure requirement constitutional). 
44
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/1
2020] FIRST AMENDMENT CYNICISM AND REDEMPTION 1003 
so-called “crisis pregnancy centers,” which provide services for women 
in order to serve as an alternative to their procuring of an abortion, 
because abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic,’”210 and the 
disclosure requirements were either unduly burdensome,211 or unrelated 
to the specific services being provided by the pregnancy centers.212  This 
decision accords with the notion that corporate disclosure requirements 
should generally pass constitutional muster, unless they are designed to 
influence the marketplace of ideas, or unless they touch upon the actual 
conscience of the individual actors comprising the corporation.    
Beyond allowing for greater regulation of corporate disclosures and 
more disaggregating of free speech liberties from economic 
restrictions, the Supreme Court should draw clearer lines between 
speech and conduct, especially for speech that implicates historically 
disadvantaged groups.  The speech about these groups should be 
protected, but conduct causing further oppression can be more greatly 
scrutinized. 
C. Hate Speech and the Speech/Conduct Distinction 
Many progressives champion creating an exception from First 
Amendment protection for “hate speech.”213  America is exceptional 
among Western democracies for protecting this type of speech.214  Despite 
what appears to be vast misinformation among the public to the contrary, 
hate speech is not an unprotected category of speech.215  This country’s 
commitment to viewpoint neutrality, fundamental to our free speech 
regime, mandates this bit of American exceptionalism.  That said, the 
Court should be vigilant to guard against transforming the necessary First 
Amendment protections for hateful and bigoted speech, which 
disproportionately harm historically disadvantaged groups, into a way for 
free speech doctrine to produce an overabundance of outcomes that 
undermine progressive causes. 
 
 210. Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018). 
 211. Id. at 2377. 
 212. See id. at 2373 (“The notice in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics provide. 
Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored services—including 
abortion. . . .”). 
 213. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1596 (2010); MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE 
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound; A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 143-45 (1982).  
 214. See Waldron, supra note 213, at 1597-98; see also Guy E. Carmi, Dignity--The Enemy from 
Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 988-89 (2007) (describing America’s approach, unique among Western 
democracies, of favoring freedom of expression over the elusive concept of “human dignity”). 
 215. Ken White, Actually, Hate Speech is Protected Speech, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2017). 
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One way the Court can guard against hate speech protections rendering 
the First Amendment too politically polarizing is to clarify, at an abstract 
level, the distinctions between protected speech, which receives the 
highest constitutional scrutiny, expressive conduct, which received 
intermediate scrutiny, and unprotected conduct.216  In cases involving free 
speech challenges to public accommodations laws,217 the Supreme Court 
should clarify what constitutes pure speech and what constitutes 
expressive conduct, thereby allowing public accommodations laws that 
prevent discrimination in the provision of goods and services to trump 
free speech rights when expressive conduct, and not pure speech, is at 
issue.218  In a future case similar to Masterpiece Cakeshop,219 where the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission sued a Christian baker who refused to 
make custom-design cakes for same-sex weddings, the Court must clarify 
where First Amendment rights insulate people from public 
accommodations laws. Perhaps a cake is expressive conduct, while the 
words on a cake are pure speech.220  Or perhaps even stock phrases on a 
cake are not pure speech, if they are commissioned by another,221 but 
photographs—a traditional medium of artistic expression—are always 
pure speech.222  Where the Court draws the line, in terms of restoring faith 
in the First Amendment generally, may actually be less important than 
creating a line that is clear, defensible, and consistently applied.223  
Drawing the line between speech and expressive conduct in this arena will 
not be obvious or easy, but creating clear jurisprudence and then applying 
it consistently will be paramount to reducing concerns about First 
Amendment cynicism. 
The other increasingly relevant domain involving hate speech, where 
courts will have to draw clear, meaningful lines, involves rallies by groups 
 
 216. See supra note 113. 
 217. This issue was presented in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018), but the Court decided the case on religious liberty grounds instead.   
 218. For deeper analysis on this issue, see Goldberg, supra note 50, 657–62. 
 219. See supra notes 197 & 219. 
 220. See Goldberg, supra note 50, at 660 (“The writing on a cake, if conveying a unique message, 
likely should be considered pure speech . . . .”). 
 221. Id.  (“Plus, the application of the expressive conduct test demonstrates that very little speech 
appreciable by a reasonable observer would be compelled by requiring bakers to offer cakes on the same 
terms to all customers. This application of the expressive conduct test further illustrates why a blank cake 
should not be considered speech, but expressive conduct, in the first place.”). 
 222. This is the argument made in a brief by Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh.  See Brief for 
American Unity Fund & Profs. Dale Carpenter & Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 
16-111), 2017 WL 4918194, at *14 (arguing that courts should treat as pure speech items, even those sold 
in commerce, that use media traditionally associated with expression). 
 223. Surely, where the Supreme Court draws the line is highly significant for those affected by the 
outcome of the case, but in terms of First Amendment and rule of law principles, clear line drawing that 
maintains the doctrine’s nonpartisan and apolitical is paramount. 
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associated with hateful speech or conduct.  Currently, cities may attempt 
to block rallies held by groups associated with white supremacist views, 
especially after the deadly Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, 
Virginia.224  Unfortunately, many groups are going to have some number 
of violent adherents, and the organizers of a rally should not be punished 
in the form of censorship for the actions of members, and the government 
cannot dent permits only to groups with certain viewpoints based on the 
violent actions of outlier members, if groups with differing viewpoints 
and potentially violent outlier members are granted rally permits.  
However, if a hateful group is encouraging or inciting violence, the city 
should not have to permit rallies for speech that has lost its protection due 
to the necessarily high incitement standard.225 
As an example, the City of Dayton initiated a lawsuit against the 
Honorable Sacred Knights, an organization affiliated with the Ku Klux 
Klan, and its leader Robert Morgan.226  The Honorable Sacred Knights 
received a permit from Montgomery County to hold a rally at Courthouse 
Square in Dayton,227 and the City alleged that this rally, which will 
include 10 to more than 20 members, would constitute both an illegal 
paramilitary operation and a public nuisance.228  Rally attendees had made 
inflammatory, hateful posts to social media, have pointed guns at the 
camera and held nooses, which, if the organizers or key members 
reasonably expected to produce imminent lawless action and would 
reasonably incite imminent lawless action, would rise to the level of 
unprotected incitement.229  In addition, although the heckler’s veto 
requires the police to protect speakers from violent reactions instead of 
arresting speakers, if a city cannot protect its citizens, it is permitted to 
disrupt speech to declare a state of emergency.230 
That said, courts need to be extra cautious about finding that rally 
organizers encourage violent conduct, because weakening the incitement 
 
 224. See Associated Press, James Alex Fields’ Trial in Deadly Charlottesville White Nationalist 
Rally Set to Begin, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 26, 2018, 8:25 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/james-alex-fields-trial-deadly-charlottesville-white-nationalist-rally-set-n939991. 
 225. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[C]onstitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.”). 
 226. See Complaint, City of Dayton v. Honorable Sacred Knights and Robert Morgan, Case No. 
2019 CV 01109 (Ohio. Civ. Div. Mar. 13, 2019.).  
 227. Chris Stewart, Klan Rally Permit Approved by Montgomery County: We Are Legally 
Obligated, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Feb. 22,2019), 
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/klan-rally-permit-approved-montgomery-county-are-
legally-obligated/rusoUfEPag21x3WOlaw8WJ/. 
 228. See Complaint, supra note 226. 
 229. See supra note 120. 
 230. See supra note 177. 
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standard is an easy way to pretextually discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint.  Groups across the political spectrum have adherents who 
advocate some forms of violence in some situations.  Courts should be 
reluctant to simply make the problem of white supremacist rallies go away 
by declaring certain groups paramilitary organizations simply because 
some members carry weapons – but may find that groups are unlawful 
paramilitary entities if they train their members to use firearms for 
violence, during rallies or otherwise.231  Ultimately, the City of Dayton 
settled with the Honorable Sacred Knights, who were permitted to bring 
some guns to the rally but not carry assault rifles.232  Only nine members 
demonstrated, and no violence occurred, but protecting the city from 
potential clashes between the Honorable Sacred Knights and the counter 
protesters cost the city $650,000.233  This is a hefty price to pay, but much 
of the security concern comes from the number of counter protesters, who, 
far outnumbered the  Honorable Sacred Knights members.234 
One way out of our current vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism 
is to strengthen our commitment to protect even the most noxious, hateful 
ideas, so long as they do not materialize into conduct.  Progressives are 
needed to commit themselves to this approach.  Of course, hateful speech 
disparages the historically marginalized based on identity characteristics, 
and thus is speech especially antithetical to the progressive mission.  To 
convince progressives that this speech must be protected anyway, 
progressives must first be given examples, like Black Lives Matter, or 
even rock and roll music (and its relationship to suicide or homicide),235 
where certain groups were blamed for the violent actions of their 
adherents, or even perceived adherents.236  Thus, members of 
 
 231. See, e.g., City of Charlottesville v. Pa. Light Foot Militia, No. CL 17-560, 2018 WL 4698657, 
at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2018) (“Plaintiffs assert that Redneck Revolt along with the various other militia-
type groups, assembled with the purpose of training, practicing with, and/or being instructed in the use of 
firearms and other techniques… capable of causing injury or death. Plaintiffs also allege that Redneck 
Revolt's intent was that its actions would be used in the context of and in furtherance of a civil disorder, 
and such is planned in the future.”).   
 232. Chris Stewart, Dayton, Klan Group Reach Agreement over Guns, Masks, DAYTON DAILY 
NEWS (May 14, 2019), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/crime--law/dayton-klan-group-reach-
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organizations of various political stripes should remain concerned about 
denying access to groups looking to organize or host marches or rallies.   
Finally, allowing open access to speech in a public forum serves 
progressive ideology, because it increases access to audiences for those 
with less money and power.  In this way, allowing even a Ku Klux Klan-
affiliated group to march is consistent with the free speech as equality 
approach to the First Amendment.   
CONCLUSION 
Loss of faith in the judiciary and rule of law ideals are a special concern 
in the context of the First Amendment.  Unless courts apply free speech 
protections in nonpartisan ways that lead, on net, to apolitical outcomes, 
the primary purpose of free speech rights is nullified even as the doctrine 
is applied. Instead of the government’s engaging in viewpoint 
discrimination, the courts will then have favored certain speech based on 
its viewpoint.  Both the political left and the right have been accused of 
improper and politically motivated interpretations of the First 
Amendment, but these accusations are overstated and can be 
jurisprudentially dangerous. 
To mitigate the current vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism, 
where perceptions of political applications of the doctrine lead to a loss 
of faith in a politically neutral First Amendment regime, courts should 
generally consider a libertarian approach to the First Amendment, but 
must temper this with an egalitarian approach to the First Amendment in 
cases of necessary government intervention, such as heckler’s veto cases.  
Further, the Supreme Court can better manage its docket to select more 
cases where the free speech as liberty and free speech as equality 
conceptions overlap; should take specific measures to disentangle 
economic rights from free speech rights; and should ensure that the 
necessarily robust for hate speech do not insulate hateful conduct from 
constitutional scrutiny.  A restoration of faith in our First Amendment is 
possible and may precipitate a reaffirmation of rule of law principles in 
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